THE ISLAND OF PANAY: APRIL, 1898, TO JULY 4, 1902
Estado Federal de Bisayas transfers to Cabatuan, Iloilo on Feb 12 1899 after Iloilo City and Jaro fell ... (Cabatuan then remained the capital of the revolutionary government continuously for 9 months, until Nov 23 1899, when it was captured by Gen. Hughes.)
3 men of Lieut. Col. Marella / Gen. Diocno are killed by inhabitants of Cabatuan, Iloilo ... (Exhibit 1255 / Fullon mentions the cause as the violation of local women in a barrio of Cabatuan.)
Gen. Delgado's strongest force is located just south of the revolutionary capital Cabatuan.
Gen. Hughes, with the bulk of his forces, 4 battalions, swings into Cabatuan by way of Tigbauan. Carpenter would then attack the defenses at Jaro and drive the retreating revolucionarios into the waiting arms of Hughes in Cabatuan and force a single decisive fight once and for all.
Gen. Hughes captures Cabatuan, Iloilo, on November 23, 1899.
THE ISLAND OF PANAY: APRIL, 1898, TO JULY 4, 1902
When war with the United States was declared, the Spanish
Government ordered Gen. Diego de los Rios, then in Mindanao, to
also take command of the Visayan Islands , and appointed him captain-general of all the Philippines, except the portion under
the immediate control of General Augustin. On May 1, 1898, there
was an uprising in Panay, but he crushed it and succeeded in keeping
the island comparatively quiet until October. In this he was
materially aided by a fleet of small gunboats, which were also useful in keeping up communication with his Government through
Labuan in north Borneo. On June 30, 1898, he was directed from
Madrid to take such measures and institute such reforms of a
civil and administrative character as would maintain the sovereignty
of Spain and provide for the defense of the integrity of her
When General Rios heard of the capitulation of Manila, he
assembled the leading residents, both European and native, of
of Iloilo, the capital of Panay, and told them  that he would
submit to the Spanish Government such plans of reforms as they
might draw up. Having done this, he ordered all officials to carry
out their duties with the greatest care in order to avoid all causes of complaint, for he realized that Spanish sovereignty, at least in
the southern islands, might depend upon his holding the people
loyal to Spain. It was, however, too late for his efforts to bear
much fruit, and about the end of August he ordered the concentration
of the Spanish forces in the Visayan Islands upon Cebu and Iloilo,
and around the last place he constructed a line of intrenchments.
With the fall of Manila insurgent agents appeared
in the Visayas and the revolutionary propaganda became vigorous. General Rios had been forced to disarm some of the native troops, . most of whom were volunteers, and in Cebu, Iloilo and Mindanao,
117 men were shot for conspiracy. These energetic measures kept the
insurgent movement down and enabled the small groups of Europeans scattered in the Visayas to save themselves.
The attitude of the Moros was such that he could not strip
all of the posts in the south of Spanish soldiers; but he sent to Iloilo all that could be spared. This concentration, according to Sastron , gave him in the Visayas 350 Spanish soldiers and 3,700 native troops, of whom 300 Spaniards and 2,500 natives were in Iloilo. The natives were ready to revolt, or at least the
volunteers were as can be seen from the insurgent documents of this period. When this concentration had been effected, Panay rose against the Spaniards and Iloilo was surrounded by insurgents .
The city of Iloilo is the second in size and importance in the archipelago, and accordingly the group who desired the independence of the Philippines under a government formed from themselves, early turned their eyes in that direction. In July, 1898 (P.I.R., 1171.1), a conspiracy against the Spaniards in Panay
was well underway; and by the middle of August steps were taken to organize a committee in every town in Iloilo Province for the purpose of preparing for an insurrection. It was probably in other towns as in Dumangas where Quintin Salas, the military comander chosen by the conspirators, was also the commander of the volunteers organized by the Spanish Government for the purpose of confronting an American invasion. On September 15, Pablo Araneta, who had been chosen as "general in chief of the revolutionary forces," by the conspirators, and Roque Lopez, "secretary of war of the committee of conspirators," appointed Salas to one of the higher military commands in the insurrection. At a meeting that day a plot was formed to capture Gen. Diego de los Rios upon his proposed visit to Dumangas to act as godfather to a child who was about to be christened there. This was considered a good way to begin the insurrection; but the Spanish general changed his mind and did not come, so that plot failed. The conspirators continued their preparations, meeting at dances and other gatherings arranged to cover the sittings of the insurgent committee. On September 20, the conspirators of Dumangas met at a dance in the house of Salas and swore to hold together under penalty of death. Salas then proceeded to open negotiations with a well-known bandit or "Pulahan" who promised his cooperation with 350 men. This man belonged to a class of outlaws known in Panay as "Babaylanes," who live on blackmail obtained from the inhabitants of the districts which they infest. When they are not given the cattle and money which they demand, they descend upon the towns, burning them and killing their inhabitants.
On October 5, Salas, who had a few rifles, who had been appointed Commander of the northern zone by the heads of the conspiracy, who was in command of the volunteers raised by Spain in his vicinity, and whom the leading bandit in the vicinity had promised to obey, found that he was suspected by the Spanish priests and by the head of his town, the "capitan municipal." To prevent arrest, he summoned his adherents, seized the arms in the place, and struck out for the open country where he was attacked by the civil guard and by the volunteers of the town of Barotac Viejo. This attack was due to the fact that Salas had written to the captain of volunteers there calling upon him to join him against the enemies of their country; but this man was loyal to
Spain and reported the matter to the Spanish commander of the
civil guard in the town, who, with him, answered the letter by an
attack on Salas, which the latter says he beat off. In these
preliminary movements of the insurrection, it appears that when the leaders of volunteers in the service of Spain remained loyal, they
kept their men loyal, and when they joined the insurrection, their
men went with them. By October 27, Salas, who seems to have
become the military commander in Iloilo Province under Delgado,
was busy in carrying out the orders of what he called the
"revolutionary government in Manila," by taking prisoners such
Spaniards and Spanish priests as he could lay his hands upon and by
seizing their property. He ordered that all the volunteers raised
by Spain and who had received some military instruction should
pass into the service of the insurrection and should be maintained
by their respective towns until further orders. By November 8
he had 4,000 men under his command. By November 10, the
Spanish commander had agreed to evacuate Jaro, suburb of
Iloilo, which was forthwith occupied by the insurgents without opposition.
General Rios made no great effort to hold Panay. There was
no reason why he should have done so. His force was small and
he had every reason to suspect the native volunteers. An armistice
had been signed on August 12, 1898, between Spain and the United States, and if his country was to lose the Philippines he had no
reason for sacrificing the lives of his men in holding positions
for the Americans; while if Spain retained them as a result of
the treaty of peace, a war of conquest would be necessary and
this could best be provided for by withdrawing his men from the
field and concentrating them where they could recuperate and
prepare for new exertions. He accordingly withdrew his troops
in Panay to Iloilo.
Aguinaldo evidently did not feel that the insurgents in the
Visayas were altogether in his interest and feared that they would
succeed in establishing a government over which, he would have only
the most nominal control. This he attempted to prevent by sending
armed expeditions from Luzon to take possession of the more
important islands of the south in the name of his government and
establish his authority in them. On August 30, 1898, he appointed
Gen. Ananias Diocno commander of an expedition for Capiz Province, Panay, and ordered him to set up there the military and civil organization which Aguinaldo had decided upon for those
parts and authorized him to collect contributions of war (P.I.R. 310.1). It is of interest, as showing distrust of the Visayan
committee that Aguinaldo at first intended to appoint Pablo Araneta
as military commander, but then changed his mind and, designated Diocno, whom he warned to respect the revolutionary
officers in the Visayas and to maintain friendly relations and cooperation with them. He told him that as hostilities between Spain and the United States had ceased, the forces of that country
would have no right to attack any point in the Phiippines ; but he strongly recommended that the revolutionary forces should press on until they had possession of Iloilo, and the fact that the Americans might be in that city should not be considered an obstacle to an attack upon it (Exhibit 1186). Diocno sailed from Batangas Province in September with a small force to carry out these instructions and shortly afterwards reached Panay with his lieutenant, P. Mondejar. On September 6, 1898, the expedition for Antique Province, Panay, under Gen. Leandro Fullon, embarked at Cavite on the gunboat Don Francisco, which had been equipped with some cannon. This vessel then sailed for Batangas, where some arms were put on board. On September 20, she arrived at Antique, and next day Fullon's command - only 130 men, but having 430 rifles with them - landed at Pandan. They left the same day for the next town, leaving 12 rifles and some ammunition behind them. Pandan at once gave its adhesion to the revolution and hoisted the tricolored flag. By October 1, 1898 insurgents armed with bolos and lances had gathered in this town and had intrenched it, but there were there still only 12 rifles. On October 3 a small force of Spanish infantry occupied the place without opposition, and two weeks afterward withdrew to Iloilo by sea. On February 10, 1899, the local officials who had been installed by Fullon, upon his arrival, burned the church and the municipal building to prevent their being occupied by the Americans (P. I. R., 1047.1).
The Spaniards seem to have been allowed to concentrate in Iloilo without much opposition. Indeed the feeling in Panay against them was not strong and there was no particular desire on the part of the Visayas to make them prisoners. Fullon and the other representatives of Aguinaldo may have been more warlike, but they had few rifles and the people of the country required all their attention.
In October, 1898, Aguinaldo appointed Diocno to Command all the forces in Panay (P. I. R., 1121.1), which at that time were not particularly formidable. About Jaro on October 20 were 1,795 insurgents, only 173 of whom had firearms, and they had only about 10 rounds of ammunition each. The remainder had knives for weapons (P. I. R., 1160.9).
At the end of December, 1898, the insurgents in Iloilo and thereabouts, numbered 5,000, 2,000 armed with rifles and the remainder, sandatahan, armed with bolos. The man who wrote this begged Aguinaldo to order the generals in command of the expeditionary forces to submit to the government established in Panay. They were not doing so, and constant friction was the result (P. I. R., 311.7).
The Spanish force was the stronger. An insurgent agent wrote to Aguinaldo from Iloilo on October 9, 1898, that the Spaniards had 600 soldiers in Antique Province, 500 in Capiz Province, and about 2,000 in Iloilo, while in its suburb, Molo, there were some
600. Those in and about the city were both Spanish and native troops, while the two other detachments were all Spaniards (P. I. R., 186.6). Another man reported apparently a month later, that General Rios had with him 1,140 men of the regular army, 250 armed volunteers and 3,000 natives equipped only with bolos. The writer thought that these men would join the insurgents if they could obtain arms, and that the people of Panay and Negros would attack the small Spanish garrisons if they but had the a means (P. I. R., 311.11).
The conditions in the Visayas were not satisfactory to the men about Aguinaldo. They were not strong enough: to send many men to the south and yet they had to do something to establish their supremacy. On November 6, 1898, an agent wrote from Panay that an expedition should at once be sent there, not only to attack the Americans in case they obtained the the surrender of Iloilo from the Spaniards, but also to dominate the people, for the desire of annexation to the United States had taken possession of them. He said that if things were left to go as they had been going, the Visayas would separate from Luzon (Exhibit 1188). Indeed, the leaders of the insurrection in the Visayas had probably no intention of giving more than a nominal obedience to the men in the north and decided to organize a government whose powers they would themselves control.
On November 17, 1898, at Santa Barbara, the members of the revolutionary committee, the general in chief, the commanders of the military zone and a "sufficient number of officers," proceeded to establish a provisional revolutionary government. They decided that Aguinaldo should be informed of their action, which was announced forthwith to the towns and provinces of the Visayan Islands within the jurisdiction of the "regional committee."
The revolutionary government and the office of general of the liberating army having been thus constituted, it affectionately greets the sovereign people of the Visayas who have just succeeded in obtaining their liberty under the protection of God and of the Most Holy Virgin under the shadow of the tricolored flag and upon the basis of the constitution of the Philippine republic (Exhibit 1192).
During November, representatives of the government thus established, proceeded to organize the towns in accordance with the regulations issued by Aguinaldo.
A military force was also raised, not as the army of the insurrection, but as the army of the insurrection in Panay. Commissions were issued to the officers by the "Honorable Citizen Señor Roque Lopez, president of the revolutionary government of the district of the Visayas," upon the nomination of the general in chief and in accordance with the decision of the council of government (P. I. R., 1046.10).
By December 4 a truce had been arranged with General Rios, who assured the insurgent leaders that he felt that he was merely a guest in the Visayas. He accordingly turned over to them Jaro and La Paz, towns so close to Iloilo as to be almost suburbs
of that place, and permitted the establishment of a Filipino governor in Molo, although he kept a Spanish garrison there, as there were not sufficient quarters for his men in Iloilo. Negotiations were also going on for the surrender of that city which the revolutionary government desired to have in its possession before the arrival of United States troops. But Aguinaldo was warned that it was very doubtful whether the regional government would resist, as had been ordered, the occupation of Iloilo by the Americans (Exhibit 1197).
On December 12, 1898, a meeting of the members of the government was held to hear the report of a committee which had been to Manila and had brought back instructions from Aguinaldo to organize a council for the Visayas which were to henceforth be one of the three States into which the Philippines were to be divided - Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao (Exhibit 1199). The members present were willing to organize in this new form, but the commissioner refused to turn over his written instructions from the government at Malolos, as he could not recognize them as the government of the Visayas, as they were neither the revolutionary regional committee to which his instructions were directed, nor were they the council of state which it was intended to organize. The insurgent group accordingly determined to call a meeting of the army and the people to let them decide whether the government should be reorganized as a council of state. This step was probably not taken without military pressure, for about December 10 not only the Visayan force under Araneta, but the expeditionary troops from Luzon, under Fullon and Diocno, had occupied Jaro (P. I. R., C. 6).
As the assembly took place after a notice of only twenty-four hours, the people could not have been consulted in regard to this change in the form of government of those islands, which henceforth became the "Federal State of the Visayas." The official record that it had been made was signed by 71 representatives of the government, of the army and of the people (Exhibit 1200). Committees were appointed to conduct public affairs, and Aguinaldo was notified of the change in the form of administration.
At the suggestion of the Spanish authorities in Iloilo, on December 21, 1898, three commissioners were empowered to arrange for the surrender of the capital and Molo (Exhibit 1202). The next day an agreement was entered into for this purpose, and the representatives of the Federal State of the Visayas promised to respect the lives and property of the residents of that city when it was delivered to them on December 26. At a meeting held on December 23, officials were appointed for the government of the place, and it is of interest to see that it was decided to have only one company of from 80 to 125 men for a guard.
Some time before December 13, 1898, General Rios, then the Spanish commander in the Philippines, submitted to General Otis
a proposition for the relief of the Spanish garrison at Iloilo by United States troops  as he desired to withdraw his soldiers and concentrate them at Zamboanga. General Otis informed him that he appreciated his offer, and that permission would be sought to take advantage of it as soon as the negotiations in Paris indicated unmistakably that the United States would succeed, to the government of the islands. On December 14 General Otis cabled to Washington that  -
Bankers and merchants, Manila, with business houses at Iloilo, petition American protection at Iloilo. Spanish authority there still holding out, but would receive United States troops. Insurgents reported favorable to American annexation. Can send troops. Shall any action be taken?
In sending this dispatch he was undoubtedly influenced by the position of the Spanish prisoners in his hands, who were becoming anxious to return to Spain. It is evident from the insurgent records that a number Spanish non-commissioned officers became officers in Aguinaldo's forces, and that some Spanish officers, if they did not actually receive commissions from him, at least assisted him. These were captives who, by such activity, alleviated the hardships of their
lot, but there was also a decided possibility that some Of Spanish soldiers in Manila, if much longer held in their confined quarters, might join the insurgent forces. The American commander
was accordingly anxious to return them as soon as possible
if the United States was going to hold the archipelago.
In October, 1898,  a number of passports were issued to Spanish officers to return home in advance of any instructions for the general repatriation of prisoners. On December 14 the Spanish authorities served notice of the contemplated discharge of 3,000 native soldiers of the Spanish army held as prisoners by the Americans. It was known that a number of these had already deserted to the insurgents, but General Otis asked that their discharge should be deferred until both Spain and the United States could come to a decision upon the disposition to be made of them. But the Spaniards were anxious to settle affairs preparatory to their departure and discharged them in Manila. Some were taken to a western province to Luzon and released; some were permitted to go where they would, or to remain if they desired. Many of them became the most formidable of Aguinaldo's troops. On December 23  a dispatch was received from Washington by General Otis, which said:
The President directs that you send necessary troops to Iloilo, to preserve the peace and protect life and property. It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm.
General Otis at once cabled to General Rios, governor-general of the Philippine Islands, then at Iloilo, that a considerable force of the army and navy would leave for that place in two or three days, and that the commander had been directed to confer with him. The cable message was sent to Capiz, where gunboats from
Iloilo called for dispatches at short intervals as the telegraph line from there to the capital of Panay was in the hands of the insurgents. This dispatch reached Capiz at 5.50 p.m., December 23. At 5.35 p.m. two Spanish gunboats had left Capiz for Iloilo with dispatches which had accumulated there. The cable operator reported that all the Spaniards would leave Iloilo for Zamboanga on the afternoon of December 24, 1898, and that General Rios would proceed to Manila by the end of the month. This information reached the American commander on the morning of December 24. That night a vessel with one of General Otis' staff on board sailed with orders to communicate, if possible, in person, with General Rios and request him to continue in possession until the arrival of United States troops. The staff officer returned on December 28 and reported that General Rios had evacuated Iloilo on the evening of December 24 that he had found the city in the possession of the insurgents and their flag flying, but that the insurgent authorities expected the arrival of American troops and that there was a widely prevailing sentiment in the place in favor of receiving them without resistance.
While the American commander was awaiting instructions from Washington in regard to relieving the Spanish garrison in the
capital of Panay, there was in Manila a committee from that city. General Otis said  these —
representative businessmen had come up from Iloilo a short time before for the
purpose, as they asserted, of arranging matters with the Americans so that
there might be a peaceful solution of affairs. They were introduced by some
of the native citizens in whom confidence was placed, and expressed themselves as desirous of having the United States go to Iloilo and to accompany them in order that they might prevail upon the people to receive them without opposition. These men were intelligent and apparently very much in earnest, and General Miller, who was present at the last conference, fully shared my opinion of their honesty.
General Otis accordingly instructed General Miller on December 24 that upon his arrival off Iloilo :
You will place yourself in communication with the insurgent authorities through the representative men of Iloilo whom you will take from Manila with you on your voyage, and who will use their best efforts to bring about a successful determination of any difficulties which may present themselves.
In compliance with these orders, he 
took them with him on his own transport and gave the best accommodations the vessel offered, free of charge. Upon arrival at Iloilo he sent them into the city to prepare the way for him and they were seen no more. * * * It was subsequently ascertained that while temporarily sojourning in Manila, one of these representative men quietly visited Malolos and received Aguinaldo's orders which he carried with him to his people.
The records of the insurrection throw further light upon the character and purpose of these so-called representative business men of Iloilo.
Aguinaldo had gone to Cavite Viejo on December 23, to spend a few days and had left all routine matters in the hands of Gen. Mariano Trias, Jose Ner, one of the men who had come to Manila
from Iloilo, went to Malolos and reported that two days before
General Otis had sent for them and told them that he was about
to send 2,000 men under General Miller to the Visayas to occupy
Iloilo, and the other islands of the south. He was anxious to
avoid any conflict and told them so (Exhibit 1205). They agreed
to serve as intermediaries, but declined to assume any
responsibility; still it is possible that Ner did not say to Aguinaldo's representative just what they said to General Otis. He certainly
told Trias that he had sent word to the United States military
governor that if, upon their arrival, Iloilo was found to be in the
possession of the revolutionary forces, the disembarkation of troops should be postponed until a decision upon the matter could be
obtained from the Filipino government presided over by Don Emilio Aguinaldo; but that no reply to this message had been received.
It is not probable that this message, if sent, was received by
General Otis, as it would undoubtedly have shown their character
was not that of "representative business men" and would probably
have prevented their transportation south with the American expedition.
Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo that as he was not able to consult
with him upon the matter, the secretaries present in Malolos had
assembled and agreed that the Americans should not be permitted
to land in places which had been taken by the insurgents, even if
it was necessary to resort to arms to prevent it. In case the
Spaniards still held Iloilo, the Americans were to be permitted
to relieve them and occupy the place (Exhibit 1205). Instructions
were drawn up to be taken by Ner which warned revolutionary
committee not to recognize the sovereignty of the United
States, and ordered them to press the attack upon the Spaniards,
so as to forestall the Americans in possession of Iloilo. If they succeeded in doing this and the United States troops then
attempted to occupy the city, they should attack them (Exhibit 1208).
In order to encourage the insurgents in Panay to do this,
they were informed that the Americans were always much alarmed
at the sight of bolos glittering in the hands of their enemy.
Indeed four United States soldiers had died near Manila of fright
at the very sight of them. This was interpretation placed upon
General Otis' efforts to avoid war. The committee was also advised
to have the fighting done by the simple and uneducated people
who could be persuaded to attack by promises of promotion to
general and such rewards. Educated men were hardly fit for war
as they were discouraged at the sight of a superior force opposed
to them (Exhibit 1209)
The commissioners from Iloilo also probably brought back
from Malolos a letter from either Felipe Buencamino or Aguinaldo,
to General Rios, dated December 25, 1898, asking him to join the
insurgents in their attack upon the Americans (Exhibit 1206).
This must have been intended for use in case the Spaniards
still in possession of the city when the United States transport arrived in the harbor.
In return for this service, the Spanish commander would be
promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general and the 9,000 Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents would be released. The
Spanish soldiers would pass into the common army, there would
be hurrahs for Spain and the Philippines, united as a Federal
Republic, and there would then still be hope of saving from
ship-wreck the sovereignty of Spain in the archipelago. This letter
exists in the insurgent records as an unsigned draft, written on
the paper used in Aguinaldo's private office. It would hardly
have been kept as a retained paper if a fair copy had not been made, signed and prepared for delivery.
These letters and instructions were evidently prepared in the absence of Aguinaldo. He either reached Malolos in time to sign those prepared for him or some one else completed them by the signature of the president of the Philippine Republic (Exhibit 1209). These documents either expressed his ideas or else the group which at that time directed the insurgent movement under the firm name of "Aguinaldo" felt that they were strong enough to force him to acquiesce in any decision they saw fit to make.
On December 26, 1898, an American expedition composed of a light battery and two regiments of infantry, under command of Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller, sailed for Iloilo under convoy of vessels from the fleet. General Miller was instructed  to communicate with the Spanish commander if he was still there, and invite him to remove his command in accordance with his understanding with General Otis, and permit the formal occupation of the city by the United States. In case he found the insurgents in possession, he was ordered to proceed with great caution, avoiding all manifestations of immediate forcible action. General Miller was directed to make known to the inhabitants the purpose of the United States, which, having succeeded to all the rights of Spain in the Philippine Islands under treaty stipulations following conquest in the eastern and western hemispheres, intended to establish among them an efficient and most stable form of government which was to protect them fully in all their private interests and liberties, in which government they were to have representation. Certain native soldiers of the Spanish army who had been discharged in Manila, were sent down by the vessels carrying General Miller's command to be returned to their homes in Panay. It was hoped that this would have a good effect upon the people. General Otis told him that the representative people of Iloilo were a superior class and amenable to reason, and that it was believed that they would place confidence in the faith and good intentions of the United States and would accord him a most favorable reception. But he was charged to make no undue haste, and in case he found that he could not effect a landing without a conflict, he was ordered to hold his troops upon his transport and in the vicinity
of Iloilo, until he received further instructions from the American military governor in the Philippines.
The Spanish native soldiers sent to Iloilo were a portion some 700, who had been sent by General Rios  to Manila without permission or warning for discharge from the Spanish service. They were discharged by his officers upon arrival in the harbor, and after much deliberation it was decided by General Otis to land those who desired to remain in Luzon on northern shore of Manila Bay and to send to Panay those who desired to go south. The two hundred who elected to go south, were each given a small sum of money, rationed and landed upon the Panay coast. It is probable that they joined the insurgents.
When General Miller arrived in the harbor on December 28,
an aid of Gen. Martin Delgado, commanding in Iloilo, immediately
came on board, requested an interview, and desired to be informed if there was any intention of interfering in Panay. General at once wrote to the insurgent authorities  that he had come
with the expectation of relieving the Spanish garrison of Iloilo and of occupying the city, but upon his arrival he had found
that the city was reported to be in the possession of native troops.
He informed them that the Government of the United States had succeeded by virtue of treaty stipulations to all the rights of
Spain in the islands, and invited a conference on board his ship
with representatives of the commanding officer of the troops at
Iloilo and the people of the place and the island of Panay.
This letter was taken on shore by officer of General Miller's
staff, who were accompanied by the four residents of Iloilo who had come down from Manila. The American officers were received in the presence of General Delgado by a committee of
which R. Lopez was the head, and were almost immediately asked
if they brought any instructions from Aguinaldo. They answered
that they had none; that their instructions were from General Otis.
The staff officers found the committee polite, but General
Miller thought them determined not to give him control unless
he used force, when they would yield without much fighting. The insurgent force was estimated at 800 well armed men, 1,000 badly
armed men, and 1,000 armed with old guns, pikes, etc. General
Miller was told, probably by foreign residents of the place, that
now that the city had passed into the hands of the insurgents,
the committee was afraid to express an opinion in favor of the United States. He accordingly recommended that force should be used at once .
In response to the invitation of the American commander, a
committee of persons having civil control of Iloilo and also claiming control of the island, came out for a conference and claimed
that they could not surrender the city without orders from Aguinaldo. General Miller  had a long talk with them and explained
the kind of government which would be established in accordance with his instructions; told them that there was no
time to consult with Aguinaldo, and that he had come under orders of the President of the United States to demand control of the city of Iloilo. The committee refused to inform him whether landing would meet with armed resistance and requested time for consultation. The estimate of their force had risen to some 3,500 in Jaro and Molo, while 6,000 or 7,000 from the mountains, armed with bolos, were massed at various places. On December 30, the committee brought back a written answer from the president, R. Lopez, to General Miller, which meant that any landing would be resisted. In it he said :
In conjunction with the people, the army and committee, we insist upon our pretension not to consent, in our present situation, to any foreign interference without express orders from the central government of Luzon.
Some 12,000 natives troops were reported to have been hurried into the city, of whom 2,500 were armed with rifles. The situation was further complicated by the receipt by General Miller, of a petition from the leading business men of Iloilo dated December 29, in which they urged him to take into consideration their large interests and the probable result of a conflict with the natives —
Which in our belief would seriously prejudice and harm the trade of these islands for years to come. We ask you to consider the orders they have received from their chief, Aguinaldo, of Malolos. [10.]
These orders were probably those brought on the same transport upon which General Miller arrived.
On December 27, General Otis received the following telegram:
Iloilo, December 24.
He did not mention that he was about to evacuate, but on
the same day that the Spanish commander's dispatch was delivered,
the cable company informed General Otis that Iloilo had
been evacuated on December 24. He was, however, inclined to think that they had not done so  and reported to Washington that their departure had not been confirmed. In any case General Miller had been fully instructed as to the line of action he should pursue .
Treaty of Paris signed; my government orders me to go to Manila where I shall arrive at end of month and in accordance with Your Excellency, will hasten repatriation.
On December 28, 1898, General Otis informed General Miller that it was necessary to occupy Iloilo without conflict if possible,
but to accept it if necessary to accomplish the object. The manner
of taking possession was left to his discretion, but he was urged to avoid force if possible, as the former cabinet of Aguinaldo had resigned because of their inability to agree with Aguinaldo
and his confidential advisers. The new cabinet greatly hoped that the American commander would be obliged to use
force at Iloilo. Admiral Dewey was of the opinion that it would
be best to withdraw the expedition from in front of the place
as the insurgents there would probably not give up without a
fight; but General Otis held to his own view that it should be taken .
The excitement in Manila over the presence of General Miller's
force in Iloilo Harbor grew rapidly and manifested itself in unmistakable signs of danger to peace if an attack was made by the United States troops upon that city. The advisers of Aguinaldo desired some action by the United States which would arouse the
people to take sides against the Americans, and they believed that hostilities at Iloilo would accomplish this result . General Otis, on the other hand, knowing desire of the United States
Government to avoid hostilities, and taking into consideration the
situation in Luzon, wrote to General Miller, on December 29, that he was not to be in haste in his negotiations for the surrender of the city. He told him he could remain in the harbor with his force, and if he met decided and strong opposition he should await further instructions; for, if necessary, General Otis could direct a portion of General Miller's force to other ports in the southern islands where he would meet little or no opposition. He inclosed with this letter a copy of the instructions of the President of the United States dated December 21, directing the extension with the greatest dispatch over the whole of the Philippine Islands of the military government maintained by the United States in the bay, city and harbor of Manila . It had been translated from cipher only an hour before the letter to General Miller. Neither the contents of this order of the President nor the feasibility of its publication had been carefully considered, and although no orders to that effect were given, it was not suspended that it would be proclaimed in Iloilo. General Miller, however, under the impression that it had been transmitted for publication, issued it as soon as it was received. On January 1, 1899, he forwarded a copy of it to Roque Lopez and shortly afterwards had it translated and distributed in Iloilo . According to the American commander in the harbor, the natives laughed at it and thought that the Americans were cowards for issuing it.
Feeling against them increased, intrenchments were thrown up, and on January 5, 1899, General Miller reported that there were then 4,000 well-armed troops and 12,000 with bolos. He assured General Otis that if the insurgents were driven out of the town, they would surround it outside; and recommended that a force sufficient to beat them badly in the open field should be prepared, ready to be sent down, if needed, after the city was taken, The English and German warships and all other large vessels in the harbor had received refugees from the city, and many of the inhabitants were leaving for the neighboring islands .
According to a contemporary newspaper published in Iloilo, Roque Lopez answered General Miller on January 8, 1899, by tell-
ing him that he was not empowered to answer the proclamation of the President of the United States in full, and continued:
Let the American commander sincerely tell us which authority we should prefer: That of. the United States, arising under the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, with which we are not acquainted because we have not been legally notified thereof, or the legitimate authority of the revolutionary government of Malolos, based upon acts of conquests, prior to the said treaty of peace, and on natural bonds created by the policy and constitution established since the first moment of the revolution, on August 11, 1896?
During the remainder of January, the American troops lay off Iloilo in their transports and General Miller wrote that outwardly the best terms of friendship existed between him and the insurgents. The people there would permit the military occupation of the city as soon as it was ordered from their central government. On January 21, about 600 discharged native soldiers of the Spanish army were sent him to be landed. On February 3  he reported that it was believed that the people in the islands of Negros and Cebu realized that they could not succeed with an independent government and wanted the United States to take possession. He recommended that Iloilo should be captured and stated that he was well satisfied with a great proportion of the inhabitants of Panay, Negros and Cebu, were favorable to immediate occupation by the United States.
In view of all the foregoing, we insist upon not consenting to the landing of your forces without express orders from our central government in Malolos.
On February 7, 1899, after the outbreak of hostilities in Luzon, General Otis  applied to the War Department for authority to take possession of Iloilo. This was granted, and on February 10, General Miller made a formal demand upon the commander there to surrender the place before sunset on the following day, and warned him that if it was not surrendered it would be taken. It was not surrendered, and accordingly it was occupied by the land and naval forces of the United States upon the day set with little resistance by the insurgent garrison, who, especially the men from Luzon were, according to the reports of spectators too busy in looting the place to have any time for serious milltary operations.
General Rios in 1898, in preparation for an American attack , had placed supplies of petroleum in Iloilo, so that if the guns of the hostile fleet rendered it impossible to hold the place or the Americans landed an overwhelming force, after ordering the people to abandon the town he could set fire to it in four different places, take up a position on the left bank of the river and then destroy the bridges crossing it. The insurgent leaders had inherited this plan with the city and employed the petroleum which the Spanish commander had accumulated for the purpose, to set fire to the city before they left it; but it is significant that this fire, which was a most destructive one, was chiefly confined to the business streets where looting was most profitable and to the public buildings. The houses of natives were not set on fire intentionally. There is no-
thing to show that the patriotic people of Iloilo determined to
leave in the hands of the invader only the ashes of their city.
It is true that the insurgent force left ashes behind them, but
they were the ashes of such property of Europeans and Chinese
as the members of that force could not carry away. The insurgents
withdrew rapidly with their plunder and on February 12
the suburb of Jaro was occupied by the American force.
General Miller proceeded to establish a government for the city, and
it became at once like Manila in the north, a place of refuge where
men could be safe from the exactions of the leaders without the
American lines. Some of the members of the revolutionary
government did not leave the city when the insurgent troops departed
but stayed and promptly took office under the American government, to the indignation of the radicals whom they had abandoned. The place remained in this condition with the port opened to trade and the insurgents gathered outside the American lines, until 1899, when General Otis was able to spare troops to begin offensive operations in Panay.
Having described the relations of the Spaniards and Americans, with the insurgents in Panay, down to the time when the American troops advanced from the lines of Iloilo, it becomes necessary to give some account of what the insurgents government was in that island and of the conflicts between the Visayan officials and the military party which was led by Tagalogs or at least by men whom Aguinaldo had sent to establish his authority in the south.
The record is a voluminous one, for both time and paper were
plentiful in those parts and the officials did not have to resort to writing upon scraps torn from old documents; a habit which, although it made for brevity of correspondence in parts of Luzon, decidedly added to the difficulty of reading it.
On January 3, 1899, the council of the Visayas appointed commissioners to collect taxes in Iloilo Province and ordered the military commanders of Capiz, Antique and Concepcion Provinces to do the same. Commissioners for this purpose were also appointed for Leyte and Samar. The taxes were probably what they could get the people to pay. Certainly the parish priest of one town in Panay was called upon shortly before this time to deliver the 5,000 pesos which he had promised Quintin Salas.
On January 4, 1899, the committee at Iloilo was informed that as the Malolos government thoroughly realized that the difficulty of communications would render almost impossible any direct control by it over those provinces, it would provisionally approve such form of republican government as might be established there. Copies of the decrees and orders issued for the government of Luzon were furnished to serve for guidance. On the same day the secretary of the interior at Malolos wrote that all of the Visayas were now in their power and had accepted their government (P. I. R., 1079.2).
On January 5, 1899 (Exhibit 1212), the authorities in Iloilo proclaimed that the Spanish legislation, with certain exceptions, would be continued in force in the Visayas. The local authorities were requested to forward at once —
inventories of all property belonging to the towns and also of all that had been abandoned by the Spaniards and friars which had by right passed to the ownership of the State, as well as a statement of all municipal taxes established by the Spaniards (P.I.R., 905.1).
The clergy were still to be state officials and the native coadjutors of the friars were earnestly requested not to abandon their posts without the authority of the government. The towns in which no priests were stationed were directed to obtain them and pay them a salary. That the value of their influence over the people was fully appreciated is shown by the fact that in February, 1899, Gen. Martin Delgado ordered certain native priests to travel through the towns to -
preach patriotism and make the people of the federal state of the Visayas understand that it was their duty to defend our just cause.
The officer who forwarded the order stated that it was necessary to arouse the people, for unfortunately the majority of them cared nothing for this obligation which was placed upon them. The people were to be gathered in the churches to there hear the appeals directed to them, and he warned the head of the town to whom he addressed his letter that any indifference he displayed in the matter would be at once reported to the general in chief (P. I. R., 1010.3).
On January 7, 1899, this government (Exhibit 1214) authorized two of its members to negotiate loans either in currency or in the products of the country, and to pay interest upon them. To guarantee eventual payment, it placed, without any restrictions whatsoever, all the resources of the state at the disposal of this committee. The grant of powers was a liberal one and great confidence must have been reposed in the honesty of the commissioners. On January 15 Roque Lopez decreed the registration of the inhabitants and that all persons over 14 years of age should provide themselves with a certificate of such registration to establish their identity and citizenship during the calendar year. Women were to pay 0.75 peso and men 1.50 pesos a year (Exhibit 1217).
On January 14, 1899, the council proposed to consolidate the expeditionary troops with those of Panay and reduce the whole force (P.I.R., C. 6). This did not please them and at once increased the friction between the civil officials and the military commanders, especially those Aguinaldo had sent down from the north, although to avoid it, Pablo Araneta, a Visayan, had about this time been appointed from Malolos, general in chief of the expeditionary forces. In spite of his appointment, he does not seem to have succeeded in obtaining any control over them. The differences between the civil and military authorities led to acts of violence. Col. Quintin Salas was charged with ordering the burning
of the pueblos of Dumangas and Janiuay, Iloilo Province (P. I. R., 1160.7). In the meeting of members of the government held at Jaro on February 3, 1899 (P. I. R., C. 6) —
the commissioner de fomento Señor Fernando Salas reported the complaints of some citizens concerning abuses committed by certain generals stationed in the zones in levying contributions upon the people and in intercepting numbers of La Revolucion, especially those which contained orders prohibiting such abuses.
La Revolucion was the official organ of the government.
On January 17, 1899, Roque Lopez, "on account of the new conditions which had arisen" (P. I. R., C. 6), resigned his office of president of the federal council and Raymundo Melliza was elected president by acclamation.
As at the present time popular elections cannot be held, on account of the abnormal conditions of the country, the Sovereign People also requested by acclamation and unanimously that all the councillors should remain in their places with the same commissions which they then held. (Exhibit 1218.)
The "sovereign people" probably consisted of a crowd in front of the town hall of Jaro. Although this change had quite possibly been inspired by the more warlike men among the insurgents, the new president was no more favorable to their ideas than his predecessor. Shortly after his accession to power, he attempted to deprive the military commanders of all jurisdiction over the towns, and the volunteers of the regular army were placed in reserve without duties and probably without pay. The soldiers left were to constitute a sort of police force under control of the municipal officials (Exhibit 1220). To placate them, all generals were declared to be ex officio members of the council of Visayas.
The new cabinet of Aguinaldo had no sympathy with the desire of the revolutionary group in Panay to conduct their own affairs and on January 27, 1899, so informed General Delgado. It urged the establishment throughout the Visayas of the government for which Aguinaldo had provided in his decree of June 18, 1898, and the proclamation of the Philippine republic throughout the islands, which had not been done. On January 31, Mabini wrote to Diocno that he congratulated him upon not having recognized the federal council of the Visayas without instructions from Malolos (Exhibit 1224). It is clear that he was simply temporizing with the revolutionary authorities there until he could find an opportunity to impose his will. He warned the council that the government which Aguinaldo was proclaiming had been established throughout the archipelago was not a united one; that indeed it was not one government, but two; and that when their enemies knew this, they could use it as an argument against the recognition of the Philippine republic. The group who had come into power in Iloilo were, however, not willing to place themselves unconditionally at the orders of Aguinaldo and Mabini. An example of their feeling that they, and not the group at Malolos, should regulate affairs in the Visayas, is given by the fact that on January 26, the act establishing the insurgent government in Cebu was submitted to them (P. I. R., C. 6).
With the occupation of Iloilo by the American forces the time had passed for argument as to whether the natives or the representatives of Aguinaldo should direct affairs in the Visayas. Lopez and Melliza remained in Iloilo under the protection of the United States, although they did not break all relations with the insurgents outside the American lines.
On February 12, 1899, the headquarters of the government was moved to Cabatuan and it was in vain that the council wrote from there to Melliza telling him that his presence was urgently needed. By February 17, the vice-president had also abandoned the government, probably for Iloilo, and by April 30 the secretary of the council had also taken his departure. Señor Gella was elected president, but declined the office (P. I. R., C. 6), Jovito Yusay now acted as president of the state of the Visayas, and on May 27, 1899, was appointed president by the council. On March 4, the military commander at Santa Barbara ordered that Vicente Franco, formerly vice-president of the federal state of the Visayas, should be arrested wherever found and brought to trial as a traitor to the country (P.I.R. B. 4).
Partly owing to these defections, which were also defections from the revolutionary cause, and partly on account of the commencement of hostilities with the Americans, the military leaders now became the predominating power, and on February 21, 1899, Gen. Martin Delgado proclaimed that all persons who spread reports favorable to the Americans or who persuaded anyone to surrender to them would be promptly tried by court-martial and punished by fine and imprisonment or by death (Exhibit 1231).
On March 16, 1899, Jovito Yusay (Exhibit 1237) wrote [from Cabatuan, Iloilo] to Aguinaldo that General Diocno should be directed to place himself and his troops at the orders of the government of Iloilo, for he and his command had initiated a reign of terror in Capiz Province. He asked him to order him to turn over all his rifles to Yusay so that he could use them against the Americans and enable the town to recover their former tranquillity. The feeling between the Tagalogs and the Visayans did not grow any better and the party at Malolos found it expedient to send to the Visayas extraordinary accounts of the successful attacks which they were delivering upon the American forces. These must have been forwarded not to show what was happening in the north, for they did not do that, but to impress the people of the south with the idea that any resistance to the representatives of Aguinaldo would be in vain and would only subject the people who undertook it to ultimate punishment.
Although the military commanders in Panay wrote much of the war, no operations were carried on against the Americans; but the country was by no means at peace, and effective control by the civil authorities had long disappeared. All real power had passed into the hands of the local military commanders, but they seem to have frequently been in danger of reprisals for the sufferings
they inflicted upon the people upon whom their followers were quartered. The hatred of the Visayans for the Tagalogs was very real. On April 3, the commander of an expeditionary battalion stationed in San Miguel wrote that he had had to forbid his men going more than 50 yards outside of their barracks, and on account of the numerous complaints made against them by the people of the vicinity he had forbidden them carrying their arms except on duty. It was due to the fact that his men had accordingly not been able to defend themselves (P.I.R., 117.2), that three of his soldiers had been killed and their bodies burned by the people of the town of Cabatuan, all of whom hated the Tagalogs. On April 27, Isidoro Garcia [Isidro Garcia], commissioner of war, to calm the excitement caused by the acts of the general commanding in Concepcion Province, had to order his arrest as his troops were about to mutiny against him (P. I. R., C. 6).
On April 28, 1899, Aguinaldo at last decided to abolish the federal council of Iloilo, ostensibly because the majority of its members had remained within the American lines, and because no representatives elected by the other islands had ever formed a part of that body (Exhibit 1250). A decree to this effect was accoringly issued appointing Gen. Martin F. Delgado politico-militar governor of the province of Iloilo, Gen. Ananias Diocno to the same office in Capiz Province, and Gen. Vicente Lukban, in Samar. When Delgado was notified of this change, he was informed that during hostilities he would be in charge of operations in Panay. He was furthermore told that the change had been made to procure greater unity in action between the islands, but that it was only temporary, as, when independence had been secured, a better form of decentralized government would be established if the representatives of the Visayas decided that they wanted it (Exhibit 1250).
Six months elapsed before this military government was formally established, but on April 20, Delgado was already calling himself lieutenant-general and general in chief of the republic army of the Visayas and on April 9, Gen. Leandro Fullon, commanding in Antique Province, who also called himself military commander of the Visayas, had proclaimed a military government in his province (Exhibit 1244). To this the civil governor, Santos Capadocia Oberes, objected, on the ground that he himself had been elected governor by the heads of the pueblos, and that the government could pass into the hands of the military officials only when the state was invaded or in danger of being so. Antique was not invaded, although Iloilo Province was in the hands of the enemy. This reasoning did not change Fullon's purpose, and as he was in command of armed men, the government passed into his hands inspite of the protests of the governor (P. I. R., 116.3).
It may be well to now consider conditions in the province of Panay while they were ruled by insurgents as yet unchecked by any interference on the part of the Americans. The records
shows that the principal people there would have much preferred to be let alone to go their own way. They were willing to be guided by the instructions for the organization of towns issued by Aguinaldo, but they did not want Tagalogs collecting contributions and directing the government and submitted to it only because the men from the north had managed to obtain possession of most of the arms in the country. It is quite probable that the majority of the Visayans were not anxious to oppose any very decided resistance to the Americans, but the Tagalogs were, and drew to their side not only the more warlike Visayans but also the bandits who have always infested the island.
Shortly after his arrival, General Fulton called upon all former Spanish soldiers in Antique Province to join him and fight for independence (P. I. R., B. 12). He probably obtained reenforcements from the people of the country, but the conduct of his troops was such that on December 3, 1898, Santos Capadocia Oberes, civil governor of the province, ordered the police of pueblos to immediately take possession of the firearms in the hands not only of private individuals, but also of the members of the expeditionary army who were separated from their commands and were going about plundering the peaceful people (P. I. R., 920.1). Fullon found he had to do something, and next day informed the heads of the towns that as so many complaints had reached him of abuses and outrages committed by his soldiers upon the people, the municipal officials were henceforth forbidden to give any supplies or contributions to soldiers unless they had specific authority from him to demand it.
In November, 1898, the towns of Antique Province elected officials to serve until commissioners appointed by the dictator could arrive. In Iloilo Province the leaders appointed outright the officials specified in Aguinaldo's decrees of June 18 and 23, as they said they did not have time to hold elections (P. I. R., 1094.6). On December 2, 1898, Fullon informed Oberes that as he was about to leave for Iloilo with his expeditionary force he appointed him as his delegate to carry out the provisions of article 9 of Aguinaldo's decree of June 18. He was accordingly to hold the elections therein prescribed for governor of the province and for the provincial officials. In accordance with this order, Oberes on December 6 ordered the presidentes of the towns of the province to assemble to elect provincial officials, and warned them that as obedience to the laws is the first condition necessary in free and cultured people, if they did not obey they would come under his serious displeasure. These elections must have been held, for on December 21 (P. I. R., B. 12) the governor informed the heads of the pueblos of Antique that as his province was now free and independent, the decrees of Aguinaldo prescribing the form of civil government should be complied with; and accordingly if military officers gave them any orders, they should refuse to obey. This
construction was hardly one which men like Fullon and Delgado were likely to approve.
Shortly after Iloilo had been evacuated by the Spaniards a commissioner arrived from Malolos (P. I. R., 920.8) sent to aid in establishing the new form of government. From there he proceeded to Cebu, Leyte, Samar, and Negros for the same purpose. Probably his real duty was to report to Aguinaldo what assistance he could expect from those islands, for the revolutionary group in Panay certainly did not think that they needed any advice. As examples of their system of administration it may be of interest to notice that in December, 1898, the council of the federal state of the Visayas appointed a commissioner in charge of public works for each province in the island of Panay. These men were to see to it that the roads of their respective provinces were put in good condition, and were authorized to call upon the head men of the pueblos to use the people to make the necesssary repairs. The establishment of postal routes was ordered throughout the island. The mail was to be carried by couriers supplied by the head men of the pueblos. The latter were to collect 2 cuartos for every private letter weighing 15 grams and this sum was to be turned into the treasury of the town. In place of a stamp, the official seal of the place was to be employed, and letters were not to be forwarded unless so stamped.
One of the greatest difficulties met with by the officials, civil and military, was in collecting money. There was no spontaneous movement of the people to put their property at the disposal of the government for the purpose of national defense. On November 24, 1898, it was decided to take possession of the church funds of the island. On November 27 it was decided to convene an assembly of property owners to ascertain whether they would be willing to support the troops which had arrived from the north (P. I. R., C. 6). The property owners soon discovered that their assent would not be necessary. On February 19, 1899, the councillor of justice of Antique Province called upon all persons of property to contribute according to their means to the support of the troops, and warned them that if they failed to do so they would be considered traitors to the country, and as such would be brought to trial before a court-martial. On April 29, 1899 (P. I. R., 1046.4), the government of the province of Capiz informed Aguinaldo in the most humble terms that all the money derived from taxation and the so-called voluntary contributions in the province had passed into the hands of Ananias Diocno. The people were being maltreated by his men, the money of the province was being taken and no returns thereof could be obtained, the people had to support his force, and the council of the province petitioned for relief.
In order to induce them to espouse the cause of the insurrection, the people of the country had been promised that under the new government all men above eighteen years of age would
be required to pay only 4 pesetas a year as personal taxes, and that men serving in the revolutionary militia and in the police force would be exempt. But in April, 1899, the heads of the pueblos were collecting from 2 to 4 pesos from both men and women. The people were bitterly objecting to this failure to carry out what they said had been promised them, and it was in vain that they were assured that the larger sum had been authorized by the government in Luzon. Luzon was far and the broken promise had been made to the people of Panay (P. I. R., 889.11).
The question of personal taxation came up constantly. On April 19 Leandro Fullon convened the heads of the pueblos in Antique Province to consult with them concerning the proper amount of taxation. Complaints had been made that the taxes were onerous and oppressive and that the provisions of the fundamental decree of June 18, 1898, which directed that every man should pay 4 pesetas a year if he was not serving in the army or in the police were not complied with. Some members of the assembly thought that 4 pesetas a year (40 cents gold) should be collected, and that voluntary contributions should also be asked for. The majority of the presidentes thought that such a procedure would be too oppressive for the people. Others recommended the payment of 4 reales (26 cents gold) by the rich and 2 by the people of ordinary means, and nothing by the poor who, in place of paying any tax, would be called upon to render their personal services to the towns six days every month. Then attention was called to the fact that acts had been drawn up by the town authorities agreeing to require the payment of 2 pesos a year for the cedula personal. Some of these agreements had been approved, others disapproved by the local juntas. It was then decided that as the trade and agriculture of the province were utterly paralyzed, it would be impossible to pay so much, and the general was asked to decide upon some less onerous charge. He replied that he would leave the pueblos at liberty to decide upon some fair tax which would not be too oppressive to the people and which would still be sufficient to meet the expenses of the government. It was finally agreed to collect 12 reales (75 cents gold) from the men and 6 from the women for certificates of citizenship or cedulas, in accordance with the orders of the federal government of Iloilo, and that works of common utility should be performed by the whole population of the pueblos (P. I. R., 116.1).
This tax was the only one which any attempt was made to collect regularly, but the inhabitants of the country had to be forced to pay. On April 10, 1899, General Delgado wrote that, benignity having failed, rigorous methods would be used to enforce collections and that if the people did not pay —
I shall, with great pain, see myself under the necessity of withdrawing all my forces to the mountains and leaving them (the pueblos) to the fate which God will decide upon,
which of course meant that he would leave them to the mercy of the bandits who stood ready to descend upon them (P. I. R., B. 4). This threat was not an idle one.
The Tagalog leaders in Panay had toward the end of 1898 ordered that all rifles should be taken from the Visayans and delivered to their followers. The native forces were to be armed only with bolos. Although it is not probable exact compliance with this order had been obtained, yet the greater part of the firearms were in the hands of Aguinaldo's representatives, who held them partly to attack the Americans, partly to prevent their being used by bandits, and partly to prevent the people from revolting against the oppression of the Tagalogs. Some arms had remained in the hands of persons who did not belong to the army, but they were required to hold licenses for them which, according to an order of Aguinaldo dated November 15, 1898, could only be issued from the office of the president a the republic. This order, if enforced, gave the military commander on the spot power to confiscate them, for it must have been impracticable for a man living in the interior of Panay Province to obtain a license from Malolos authorizing him to keep a rifle or shotgun (Exhibit 1273). Detachments were stationed in all towns and defended the inhabitants against all exactions, except their own. If they were withdrawn the people would be without means of protection against the bandits. Prompt and complete compliance with the demands of the insurgent commanders was accordingly the price which had to be paid for any measure of safety whatever, and although Delgado, for one, took such brigands as he captured into the towns which they had robbed and shot them in the plaza without trial, yet the relations of the insurgent leaders with Papa in Negros show that no very definite line was drawn between the guerrillas and the outlaws. It may well have been that an insurgent commander sometimes withdrew his force and called upon the ladrones to inflict upon a town a punishment which he did not care to personally execute.
On May 9, 1899, the council of government had to listen to complaints laid before it stating that the country was being harassed by hordes of marauders, who descended upon the towns in the daytime, pillaged, and then burned them. It was accordingly ordered that the troops in Iloilo Province should be increased 2,000 men (P. I. R. C. 6). This force was probably intended to serve as a guard for the towns, but it is not probable that any attention was paid to the orders of the council by the so-called generals, each of whom had gathered his own band composed of men attached to him personally and who cared little to coordinate their actions with the followers of other leaders.
By May 13 Gen. Leandro Fullon had grown tired of having the people refuse to pay their personal tax. He accordingly ordered that all persons who failed to do so would be outlawed and fined 300 pesos. If the culprit had no money with which to pay,
he would be placed at the disposal of the authorities for forced labor either on public works or at the disposition of such private person designated to receive him until he had paid the fine by work at the rate of 1 peseta a day, or, if under 23 years of age, at the rate of half a peseta a day. At 1 peseta a day it would require one thousand five hundred days to work off this fine, which made it a rather severe punishment. Indeed, according to the custom of the country, such a sentence would have subjected the delinquent to permanent peonage. It is, however, but fair to say that peonage does not seem to be repugnant to the mass of the people there. The whole tendency of their life is toward forming tribal associations, and acceptance of peonage is perhaps one manifestation of this tendency. It is quite impossible to explain otherwise why men should be found working for infinitesimal wages upon the estate of a wealthy family to whom the workers say that their grandfathers were in debt and that they are therefore bound to work off this obligation in return for food and protection and a few clothes. Somewhat later, orders were issued that no one without a certificate of citizenship was to leave a town under pain of arrest and punishment.
Under the revolutionary government in Panay the Spanish regulations for the establishment and government of schools were continued in force. (P. I. R., B. 12.) The school-teachers employed under the Spanish Government were to be continued, and the headmen were to inspect them to see that they carried out their duties. The provincial government were to appoint them, but their salaries were to be paid by the pueblos. Not until August 9, 1899, was a scheme of education promulgated by the government of the federal state. It was ordered to be put in force in September. The lowest grades were to be taught Spanish, reading and writing, religion, and arithmetic. Geography, geometry, history, Latin, English, Visayan grammar, French, and, in general, the Spanish literary course was then to be pursued. It is interesting to notice that the federal council of the Visayas made no provision for teaching Tagalog, though they did for Greek and Latin (P. I. R., 1094.7). This official scheme for instruction was, for various reasons, never carried out.
By August 22, 1899, no inventories had been received in the capital of Antique Province of the property abandoned by the Spaniards, and Fullon accordingly ordered that they should be sent him without further delay, but they were not made. On September 29 he ordered the local officials to remit to him all the sums which they had collected from the people as taxes. Henceforth they were not to expend everything which they had collected for local needs, but the total amount was to be sent to the head of the province. All men owning real estate were ordered to make a complete report of it by metes and measures, giving at the same time a statement of its location, all in accordance with the regulations of June 20, 1898, or, if they could not be carried out, in accordance with the Spanish laws providing for the registration of real
property. Ten days were given after the publication of this order for the people living in the pueblos to comply with it or twenty for those living in the distant barrios, and if within those periods no reports had been rendered the property would be seized by the town officials and administered for the best interests of the pueblos (P. I. R., B. 12).
It is evident that the insurgent government of Panay was never a wealthy one. It is of course quite possible that all of its receipts were not recorded, but the record shows (P. I. R. 1046.8) that in October, 1899, the government of the council of the federal state of the Visayas having ceased to exist, its accounts of receipts and expenditures were investigated by a commission appointed by the civil and military governor of Panay. According to the books, 144,097.27 pesos had been received and 144,125.97 pesos had been expended, and many of the expenditures were not covered by vouchers.
On June 2, 1899, a commissioner from Aguinaldo charged with directing the revolutionary movement in the island of Negros appeared before President Yusay and his councilors. After some discussion it was decided that such a movement there would accomplish nothing and that the island should continue in its existing status; but as it was not well to break with Aguinaldo utterly, by refusing compliance with his orders, it was decided to inform Dionisio Papa, chief of the insurgent group in Negros, that he might cooperate with Aguinaldo's commissioner in his political plans (Exhibit 1256). On May 2 a letter had been received from Papa asking for instructions, and the commissioner of war of the council of the Visayas was ordered to prepare them. He was finally ordered —
to continue his attitude of armed protest. placing himself in intelligence with the committees of the north and south of Negros (P.I.R. C. 6).
The wealthy natives who owned estates in Negros, but who lived in the suburbs of Iloilo, were not anxious for war in the former island, with the inevitable result of injury to their property; but Papa, who was merely a bandit, had to be placated so that he would not burn their sugar cane and mills.
On July 18, 1899, the local presidentes of Panay, or perhaps only those of Iloilo Province, met and passed a vote of confidence in the government of Yusay (Exhibit 1258). Ten days later (Exhibit 1259) he and his council decided to draw up a memorial to the president of the Philippine Republic, to be signed by the government, the army and the people which would set forth the necessity of replacing the federal government by a politico-military one, which was what was desired by the province of Panay. Accordingly Aguinaldo's decree of April 27 should be revoked. They also declared that the time had come to establish a provincial council by election. It is possible that Yusay thought that he should be the governor with more ample powers. Nothing was done in the matter. The head of the Philippine Republic could not be easily reached and at last Delgado decided to establish the government
in Panay which had been ordered by Aguinaldo. All the garrison of Santa Barbara, with one company from the outposts, having appeared in front of his headquarters demanding this change, he issued an order on September 21 establishing the politico-military government of the province of Iloilo with himself at its head (Exhibit 1264). Yusay and his council resigned at once without protest and delivered the records of their offices to Delgado.
Aguinaldo's representative must have felt that it was then necessary to use every resource at his disposal against his opponents among the people of the people of the country, and it is probable that this suppression of the nominal government of the Visayas was not accomplished without bloodshed. Certainly some of Delgado's troops passing through the town of Igbaras about this time were attacked by the people of the place (P.I.R., 1172.1), and on September 22, 1899, a general (the commanders were all generals by that time) wrote to him that he had been ordered to concentrate all his force in Santa Barbara, as the troops of "General Araneta had revolted in favor of the government against the general in chief and against us." Delgado wrote to concentrate and keep up a steady front (P. I. R., 972.1).
On June 28 the commander at Jaro reported (P. I. R., 886.6) that the insurgent lines surrounding folio were well covered by trenches defended by 3,000 infantry, all armed with rifles and with ample ammunition. In addition, there was a regiment of artillery of 700 men, 300 of whom had rifles; they had enough cannon, and had made in the arsenal three or four rapid-fire guns, which were very queer attempts to improvise artillery. There were also some 1,500 men armed with knives, and a squadron of 300 cavalry all armed with carbines. These were the troops of Panay with headquarters at Santa Barbara. The writer did not include in this statement of strength the 500 rifles at the disposal of Gen. Ananias Diocno, whose troops were not formed into a regiment.
At the end of June, 1899, Brig. Gem P. P. Hughes was sent from Manila to command in the Visayas, and was ordered by General Otis to limit all of his operations in Panay to the secure holding of the city of Iloilo and such of its outlying villages as were then in American possession —
as no additional force could be given him, and as the policy of nonaction in the island, other than such as might be considered defensive, would result in dissensions between the Visayan and the Tagalog, who, should we (the Americans) attack, would unite for assistance .
This policy was continued until the end of October, 1899, when 1,700 additional troops were sent to Iloilo which gave the American commander a force composed of a mountain battery, two full regiments of infantry, and two battalions of a third regiment, making about 3,500 foot soldiers, which enabled him to begin offensive operations.
The four provinces into which Panay is divided have boundaries determined naturally. The provinces of Iloilo and Capiz are
separated from Antique to the west by an almost impassable mountain range, and from each other and from Concepcion by high divides and watersheds. The town of Capiz was connected with Iloilo by a rough wagon road, and a few insurgents were gathered there; but Delgado's strongest force was concentrated in Iloilo Province, south of the town of Cabatuan where the insurgent capital had been established. About Iloilo the insurgents had constructed intrenched lines within a short distance of the city, and covering all roads leading from it. These were occupied by a force which the American authorities then estimated at from 3,000 to 2,000 men, mostly Tagalogs, the greater majority of whom had been sent to assist the Visayans to drive out the Spaniards and to resist the entry of the Americans into Iloilo . It is not probable that Aguinaldo had sent that many of his followers to the south, but their number had probably been increased by soldiers driven out of Luzon. It was also known by the American authorities that  the Tagalogs and the Visayans had never held any long-continued amicable relations. Birth prejudice, attempted Tagalog domination, and the desire of many influential Visayans to follow the lead of Negros, had destroyed such mutual confidence as had originally existed; and, as a result, the Tagalogs had appropriated most of the guns and held the Visayans in restraint. At one time these difficulties had grown so serious that it was believed in Iloilo that, if not interfered with, they, after the manner pursued by the factions of southern Mindanao, would fight out the war in Panay among themselves. This condition of affairs would naturally work to the advantage of the Americans, who might well find adherents among the natives of the islands.
General Hughes decided to proceed with
three battalions four battalions, a mounted detachment, and a mountain battery to Oton; thence north to San Miguel and Alimodian, and then swing on Cabatuan. While this was being done, an attack was to be delivered from Jaro and on Pavia and Santa Barbara. Excessive and torrential rains forced a modification of this plan . The American commander, with the marching column, reached Oton on November 10; on November 20 he seized Alimodian and ordered an attack on Pavia. On November 21 an attack was delivered on the works outside of Jaro and on Pavia. On the 22d Santa Barbara was occupied without resistance, and by November 23 General Hughes was in Cabatuan otis-1899nov24-0834am. From there he reported that after two actions he had driven the insurgents into the mountains. They had been scattered and disorganized for the time at least. General Hughes occupied Passi and Concepcion Province, and, on December 10, Capiz. Most of the towns of the province received him with bands of music in place of bullets. Diocno and his Tagalogs were reported to have escaped by sea. The resistance met was not severe, but the labor of moving troops over trails swept by the heavy tropical rains was very great and exhausting. By December 16 the island of Romblon, an important point for the communication of the insurgents, has been occupied, and, on January 16, General Hughes sailed for the
west coast of Panay with 10 companies. After landing a battalion on the southwest coast of the island, he occupied San Jose de Buenavista, the principal town of Antique Province, and then proceeded up the coast, marching detachments to the principal towns of the interior, which met with resistance from only small bands. The mass of the people deserted their abodes and fled to the mountains. A native priest there accounted for this by saying that all the people knew of the Americans was what they had been told by the Spanish priests  prior to and during the Spanish-American war, and they had thoroughly impressed them with the belief that the Americans were a cruel and godless lot who had come to destroy them. This priest might have added that the same method of securing adherents had been employed by the insurgent leaders, and, in February, 1900, Fullem ordered that when an American detachment entered a town all the people were to abandon it under pain of being considered traitors, while the militia, the local police, and such volunteers as cared to join were to assemble for an attack. The American columns found no serious resistance. The chief obstacles to their advance were opposed by the nature of the country itself. About the middle of February, 1900, 167 Tagalogs, with 100 rifles, surrendered in Capiz and were sent to Taal in Luzon, from where they were permitted to go to their homes .
By the middle of March the progress made in Panay, Negros, and Cebu enabled General Hughes to look after affairs in the more eastern part of his district. Bohol island was occupied on March 17 without opposition. The people there were weary of the depredations of the insurgents from Cebu, Leyte, and northern Mindanao, and had several times requested the establishment of military control by the United States, and by April 17, 1900, General Fullon was on his way to Iloilo to surrender.
The topography of the Visayan Islands is very favorable to defense, for in all of them the greater portion of the interior is rough and mountainous. The people who inhabit the mountain country, are densely ignorant, superstitious, easily influenced by the abler natives, and many of them still hold to their native gods and heathen ceremonies. This class has always harried its lowland neighbors, and from it the Tagalog insurgents drew their principal assistance, especially their bolomen. To reduce this class to submission and to entirely check its forays on the coast towns required time. In early May, 1900, 50 stations were held by the American troops in Cebu, Panay, and Negros for this purpose, and by degrees the people so protected gained confidence and gave assistance to the Americans without fearing the vengeance of the guerrillas, which would have been visited upon them if that protection had been withdrawn.
It is now necessary to return to the record of the insurgents themselves for this period, which amplifies and gives details to the preceding somewhat summary statement of the American operations.
On October 22, 1899, the officers of the army in Panay proceeded to establish a superior council composed of a president and three representatives, one for each province, to govern that island and also to reorganize the force there. There were to be three battalions of infantry and one of engineers and artillery; but the main reliance must have been placed upon the so-called militia (Exhibit 1275). No one could tell what this force might amount to at any time, as its members were men collected temporarily from the fields and towns by the commander who needed them. Delgado at this time issued an order requiring all civilians to obtain permits for firearms in their possession (P.I.R., 1172.1) ; and when they were allowed to keep them, they were to be held at the disposal of the guerrilla commanders. This order had already been issued in Luzon.
On October 30, 1899, Delgado's force under arms was 5,000 men, including the militia which he had just organized to oppose an American advance. In preparation for the approaching hostilities, he ordered (Exhibit 1278) the establishment in the towns of supplies of food for his soldiers. These rations were to be draWn from the wealthy inhabitants of the country as contributions of war. The war having begun in Panay, it at once became an affair of guerrilla operations in which the commanders of bands, without awaiting any orders from superior commanders, were to fall upon parties of the Americans whenever they could do so with advantage to themselves. Recruits were drawn from the nearest town by the simple method of ordering the head of the pueblo to furnish the number of bolomen desired. Food and assistance were to be furnished by the heads of the pueblos upon call by the guerrilla leaders; and if they did not do so, they were to be considered as acting for the Americans and punished accordingly. When the officials of the towns took the oath of allegiance to the United States, they were informed by these guerrillas that their towns would be razed to the ground, and that the men who espoused the American cause
shall be considered as proscribed and, consequently, deserving of the terrible penalties prescribed by the laws of the revolution (Exhibit 1281).
Among the papers of the insurgents there are a few letters to American officers asking for protection against the insurgents. They represent a protest against conditions which were rapidly becoming unbearable; but most of them must have been sent without retaining copies, for in case they fell into the hands of the gueitillas they would have served as death warrants for the men who signed them. From early in 1900, they were much more frequent all over the archipelago than the number which have survived, either in the official records of the American army in the Philippines, or among the papers of the insurgents, would lead the investigator to believe. Those which were sent to the commanders of American detachments were not kept as a rule,
for a small detachment has few records. As early protection against robbers and insurgents.
It was the habit of the commanders of guerrillas to keep records in which they recorded events from day to day. The life of one guerrilla band was much like that of another, and the diary kept by the commander of the first southern zone of Antique Province varies little from many others written during the same period. That province was divided into five zones, each under command of a major and this officer's district was at peace from December 11, 1898, to January 17, 1900 (P. I. R., 1042.9). His followers lived from the country, and called upon the towns to supply their necessities, while they themselves did nothing but hear masses and have occasional parades. On December 20 the commander decided to have some intrenchments constructed, and sent off detachments to capture (cojer) enough men in the nearest town to dig them. The party returned before dawn with 70 inhabitants of the place; so they probably seized them at night in their homes. This could hardly have made the guerrilla popular, who accordingly, had to have at least one man shot, for some reason not mentioned. The record states that on January 17, 1900, an American force of 1,500 men (cavalry and infantry) from Iloilo, attacked this guerrilla force in the barrio of Guintas of the town of Antique, while a gunboat and a transport appeared on the coast ready to land troops. General Fullon at once concentrated the guerrillas of the central and northern zones upon this place, and ordered out the territorial militia of the towns to assist in the defense. The insurgents were driven out and had to retreat, chiefly, according to the report, because some traitors guided the Americans to where they could flank the guerrilla line. From January 20, 1900, to March 31, 1900 this force had 21 encounters with the American troops whose casualties were 135 killed and wounded, while their own were 14 killed and wounded. The latter statement may be correct; the former is not, If the guerrilla who kept this record really believed that the Americans fled at Patnongon on March 10, leaving 35 dead, and that they were driven back on San Jose on February 6 and on Barbaza on March 31, he must have felt that it was well worth while to continue to resist. At the rate at which he was destroying them there would, in a short time, have been no American soldiers left. But the position of the insurgent leaders was growing steadily more difficult. They found it necessary to appeal to the patriotism of the people to support the troops, and when the people saw those men driven from place to place, utterly unable to make any effective resistance, when they saw that the chief end of many of them was to live without working, they grew tired of contributing food and money. It is of interest (P. I. R., 977.4) to see that all of the insurgent leaders at one time or another in their command had to disarm the people of the vicinity. It is probable that this was done not merely to equip
their followers, but also to prevent the mass of the. people from resisting their exactions.
In Panay material aid was given to the insurgent cause by the native priests.
By the fall of 1898 the Spanish priests in Panay had fled or been captured, and their native coadjutors and assistants had succeeded to their places and endeavored to exercise the same influence over the conduct of temporal affairs which their predecessors had been able to maintain. They hoped to maintain unimpaired every power and every prerogative which the men whose places they had taken had ever exercised. Whatever they did so or not, depended largely on the ability of the priest. If he was a strong man he kept his influence over the people; if not, he probably lost power very rapidly.
The Spanish bishop of Jaro, in Iloilo Province, had taken refuge in Manila, leaving a native priest named Agustin de la Peña as administrator of the diocese. The correspondence of the bishop with him (P. I. R., 1120.1) shows the desire of this able native priest to rule, and rule alone, but without breaking with the church. He saw that he had to be on good terms with the insurgents whose success meant his continuance in power and influence, while to maintain his status of legality in the Roman Catholic Church, he had to remain on good terms with his bishop. The bishop, on his side, had to remain content with a mere shadow of control; for, conditions being what they were, he must have feared to strain to the breaking point the weakened bonds of ecclesiastical discipline. The letters of the bishop of Jaro to his administrator are full of complaints that the priests were abandoning their work, that they were working for personal advantage and for political supremacy rather than for the good of the souls entrusted to their care. His administrator tried to be on good terms with all parties; but although toward the end he went over more openly to the insurgent cause, it was not found safe to dispossess him of his ecclesiastical dignity. All of his influence was exerted against the return of his ecclesiastical superior from Manila, a return which would have reduced him to a subordinate position, and which would have forced an open rupture which he was capable enough to foresee and to desire to avoid.
Signing as ecclesiastical governor of the province, Father Agustin appointed parish priests, and informed the heads of the pueblos that they were to show them the honor and grant then the preeminence which were due them. On November 10, 1899 he asked General Smith, the military governor for the United States in the island of Negros, to release a priest whom he has ordered into confinement. He stated that he, the ecclesiastical administrator of the diocese of Jaro, well knew that ecclesiastic should take no part whatever in political matters; he had charge the priests under his control to steadfastly adhere to this rule
of action as he did himself, and closed his letter by informing General Smith that as the confinement of the priest was doubtless due to his having violated this precept, he would, himself, impose the just punishment upon him (P. I. R., 1120.2).
It is not probable that General Smith released this priest to him; if he did, the punishment he gave him for this offense could not have been a heavy one. An interesting light upon the character and methods of this ecclesiastic and of his clergy, is cast by contemporary documents. In October, 1899 (P. I. R., 1010.4), the people of the town of Leon petitioned General Delgado, commanding in Panay, to send them a religious and patriotic priest as the incumbent of the parish, Gervasio Gallofin, a secular priest, undoubtedly a native, was engaging in commercial transactions, would not hear confessions, overcharged his parishioners for the performance of the rites of the church, kept a mistress who belonged to an objectionable family, refused to permit the tolling of the bell when men were dying, and was in the habit of raping young girls in his parish house. Delgado referred the matter to Agustin de la Peña, ecclesiastical administrator of the diocese of Jaro, for him to decide what should be done in the matter. Of course the man may not have been guilty, but such charges are not made lightly against a priest in that country. Father Agustin's reply is contained in his letter-sent book (P. I. R., 1120.2). It was:
To the priest serving at Alimodian:
In many places the priests acted as spies for the guerrillas. They lived in towns occupied by American detachments and their official character was such that they were not interferred with except for grave reasons. They found out more quickly than other men what the American plans were, and could send, and according to the record they did sometimes send, warning of the approaching departure of a small body from the town, and designated a suitable place for ambushing them. In November, 1899, the priest of Calinog directed that drugged "tuba," a native drink, should be given to three American soldiers, stragglers from a column. Under its influence they became unconscious and their arms were taken. When they awoke and started to look for them they were murdered (P. I. R., 1010.2).
In punishment of the disobedience of the presidente of Leon and of the
other signers of the document submitted to our authority by the same, a document directed against the Priest Don Gervasio Gallofin, it is forbidden to celebrate religious services in the church of Leon without our knowledge.
God keep you many years.
THE ECCLESIASTICAL GOVERNOR.
DUMANGAS, November 3, 1899.
Being men of peace and of great influence in the community, their most important aid to the insurrection was given as collectors of funds and supplies for the army, a duty to which they were appointed in July, 1899 (P. I. R, 1010.1) . But although they were willing to use their influence to persuade other men to contribute
largely from their possessions, they had no desire to use the church funds for this purpose, and in Panay, as elsewhere, an interminable controversy went on concerning them.
In July, 1899, Agustin de la Peña issued a circular letter to the priests of his diocese warning them that they must resist the attempt of many revolutionary leaders to take possession of the church property and of the registers of marriages and births kept in the sacristies. These things, he said, belonged to the church absolutely and were under the charge of the bishop, for although civil officials were bound to act as protectors of the church, they had no right to interfere in its administration. The penalty for taking possession of such things was excommunication, and men who did it rendered themselves liable to that punishment. But in spite of this, and in spite of the orders of Aguinaldo dated Malolos, October 26, 1898, stating that church fund should remain in the hands of the parish priests, they were seized by the local presidentes and turned over to the military commanders to be used for expenses of the war. Finally the administrator of the diocese of Jaro changed his mind, and in November, 1899, ordered (P. I. R., 1120.4) that at least a part of the funds of nine churches under his control should be delivered to Martin Delgado, military governor for the insurgents, to meet the expense of maintaining his troops, In December, 1899, he wrote to the bishop of Jaro that the funds of certain churches of the diocese had been made away with, which was true; but he did not mention that the responsible person was himself. Later he had blanks prepared to be used by insurgent leaders in receipting for church funds —
loaned to them under directions of Agustin de la Peña, ecclesiastical administrator of the diocese of Jaro (P.I.R., 1010.9).
On May 26, 1900, the insurgent military commanders in Panay decided to resume hostilities which, they said, had been suspended for six months in accordance with the advice of the "center of information" to await the action of the United States Congress upon Philippine affairs. As Congress had not done what they hoped for, the time had come to resume hostilities; for, they said, justice had been trampled underfoot by the invaders. But the army was in chronic need of money, and accordingly the military commander ordered the people of Panay and of the island of Guimarits to pay a war contribution of from 1 peso to a peseta a week. Commissions of priests and civilians were appointed to take charge of the collections in Panay. Three months['] warning was to be given before they began, and after that period those who failed to pay would be declared recalcitrant and punished by the military authorities. The first class of contributors was composed of generals and field officers of the army, parish priests, members of town governments, owners of estates, and prosperous establishments, and Chinese. Officers of the army and
citizens of some means were put in the second class (P. I. R., 1121.2).
The insurgents now united into small bands and returned from the mountain country. As the American troops were divided up among the more important towns of the island, they determined to annoy them by surprise and ambush, even if they did not succeed in destroying them. In July, 1900, Delgado probably did not have more than 900 men armed with rifles in Iloilo Province (P. I. R., 117.5) and some of them must have been detached as escorts to the 8 officers engaged in collecting contributions. This was a small force, but it moved rapidly and was large enough to serve as a nucleus around which the militia could be gathered if a favorable opportunity occurred, for the insurgents reckoned upon forcing the people to attack the scattered garrisons and kept spurring them on to do it. Their plan was to keep the Americans in constant preparation for defense in the middle of hostile communities in which no man who left his barracks at night would be safe and; they hoped that the climate and the exhaustion of such prolonged strain would so weaken the American force that the Government of the United States would finally abandon the Philippines for the same reason that the leech-infested jungles of part of Luzon are avoided by the natives. A leech is not a formidable animal, but men attacked by leeches day after day are finally worn out.
To be successful, this system of warfare required the unwearied support of the entire population, but the unrelenting pursuit of the guerrillas by the Americans forced them in their necessity to make ever increasing demands upon the exhausted people, and such distinction as there had been between the forces of Delgado and Diocno and the bandits of the hills grew ever less. In August, 1900, General Delgado suppressed at least one band of outlaws by enrolling them as guerrillas (P. I. R., 881.12). The cruelty and exactions of the insurgents finally drove the people of the country to side with the Americans, and then the end came quickly. But until the bands were run down and their arms taken, conditions in Panay were very bad.
Aguinaldo was quite unable to exert any control over the immediate situation. On August 9, 1900, he wrote to Delgado urging him not to yield, and assured him that the Americans had refused to grant independence only because Paterno had gone over to them. Delgado published this letter to the people of Panay on October 29, three months later, and it had probably been recently received.
Communication with the Hongkong junta was much more frequent and their influence much greater in procuring the continuance of hostilities. Copies of their letters were circulated by the guerrilla commanders, and although the expositions of the policies supported by the contesting political parties in the United States must have been utterly unintelligible in the remote Visayan
villages, yet the people could understand that a strong feeling in favor of granting independence to the Philippines had risen in the United States. This information may well have determined men who had been hesitating that it would be well to give their aid and assistance to the guerril[l]as; for, if the American troops withdrew, the insurgent leaders would have an opportunity to show that they had not forgotten those who had failed them.
The Hongkong junta had undertaken to influence public opinion in the United States by recitals of atrocities committed: by the Americans in the archipelago. These were furnished by the headmen of the pueblos of Panay in compliance with orders issued by the guerrilla commanders. Most of charges made in these reports were that American detachments had burned houses and stores of rice; but it also mentioned (P. I. R., 1045) that in many of the houses thus burned firearms had been found, and it is clear from the reports of the guerrillas that the stores of rice in the pueblos were drawn upon for food by them. In one of these reports the head of the pueblo charged an American detachment with entering houses, disturbing people at their siesta, stealing eggs and chickens, "and they also raped two or three women." In several of them occurs the statement that an old woman of 70 had been raped by 6 American soldiers. This seemed so effective a story that it was repeated with more or less details to give it an air of truth. In one of them is an account of an unfortunate young woman who, having been raped by an American soldier, rushed to the home of the local presidente of the town and disturbed him in his afternoon siesta by the recital of her wrongs. He, in answer, told her to go away and not to disturb him "as in this town the virtue of a young woman is not worth much." The deduction drawn by the narrator was that only the Americans appointed such officials.
By January, 1901, the insurrection in Panay was almost crushed out. The leaders of the "nationalists," as they then called themselves, had become leaders of bandits. The stern measure employed by the American forces had produced their effect and the people cried out for peace. The first steps were taken in Iloilo and the neighboring towns which had longest been occupied by the American forces, for, as a rule, American occupation mean American adherents. Commissioners of the Federal party went out under instructions from General Hughes, commanding in the Visayas, and one by one the leaders came in. In January Delgado wrote to one of his officers that he was about to surrender as the reelection of McKinley meant that the United States had pledged itself to continue the wars and that accordingly further resistance would be useless. He surrendered on January 11, 1900 with his immediate followers; but Salas still kept the field, doubtless fearing that some of his acts were known and that he would be held for them, although friends of his in Iloilo had written to him that the American authorities there had no document
which incriminated him in the commission of acts which would render him liable to trial (P. I. R., 1171.4).
On March 18, a very small party was attacked and destroyed, and Diocno, who had been with it, was captured wounded. The insurrection in Panay was over; the work which remained to be done was clearing the country of men who hardly pretended to be more than robbers.