Iloilo, P. I., August 15, 1900.

To the Adjutant General,
Division of the Philippines, Manila, P. Z.

Sir :—

My previous report closed June 30, 1899. At that time we were designated and known under the name of Visayan Military District and First Separate Brigade, 8th Army Corps. The command at that date consisted of the following:

Light Battery G, 6th U. S. Artillery,
6th U. S. Infantry,
18th U. S. Infantry,
1st Battalion 23d U.S. Infantry,
1st Regiment California Volunteer Infantry,
1st Regiment Tennessee Volunteer Infantry,
A detachment of Volunteer Signal Corps,
A detachment of Hospital Corps.

The returns showed at that date:

Total commissioned................................................. 206
Total enlisted........................................................ 5,546
AGGREGATE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,752

The 6th Infantry had just arrived from the United States and was still on board the transport Sherman, but during the early part of July the headquarters and two battalions were landed in the Island of Negros to relieve the 1st California Volunteer Infantry, which, when thus relieved, proceeded to Manila on the Sherman, enroute to the United States.

The 1st Battalion of the 6th Infantry was landed in Iloilo, Panay, where it was held as a reserve, subject to calls from the sub-district commanders. The facilities for embarking, etc., were so much better in Iloilo than on the open coast of Negros that it was considered better policy to hold the reserve force here than on that island where it was expected mainly to operate.

Contemporarily with the substitution of the 6th Infantry for the 1st California Volunteers, Major Cheatham was busy organizing a battalion of the U. S. Volunteer Infantry from volunteers of the 1st California and 1st Tennessee regiments, about to return to the United States, and from the men being discharged from the regular organizations owing to the terms of their enlistments.

At that time the wet season was at its height in Panay and any field operations possible of execution would have been without appreciable effect on ultimate results. Our troops occupied Iloilo and the suburbs of Jaro and Molo, with a line of out-posts running from the outskirts


of Molo around Jaro to the Jaro river and down the right bank of that stream to the sea. The 18th Infantry was located in Jaro and the 1st Tennessee Volunteer Infantry in Iloilo and Molo. The enemy was located, generally speaking, in the semi-circle starting from Oton on his right and passing over San Miguel. Pavia, Balantang, with headquarters in Santa Barbara. His force was given as between 3,500 and 4,000. The force here was too strong to lie idle waiting for dry weather and as the conditions are such in Negros and Cebu that the wet season does not preclude military operations, it was determined to devote all the efforts of the command to gaining full control of Negros and Cebu islands, and leave Panay until movement became possible.


Captain B. A. Byrne opened the operations in Negros on the 19th of July, on which date he had quite a successful affair with babaylones, near Bonbong.

Captain Charles Byrne, 6th Infantry, left Dumaguete with a command on July 20, and after a very trying march across the island on a native trail, succeeded in coming up with the ladrones on the Seapong and punished them severely.

Captain W. L. Simpson, 6th Infantry, attacked the tulisanes near Valdez, on July 27, and punished them severely.

On July 30, four men of the 6th Infantry, scouting on the Malugo, were surprised and two of them killed.

Lieutenants H. V. Evans and O. Edwards, 6th Infantry, both had some work in Negros, the former at La Grange and the latter at Saiton.

During the month, two companies of the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, were sent from Iloilo to Negros.

Lieutenant G. D. Moore, Twenty-third Infantry, surprised and dispersed with loss, a band of robbers in the mountains of Cebu.

The month's work, as given in official reports, foots up the loss of the enemy 144 killed and sixteen captured. Our own losses, four killed and one wounded.

In the first weeks of August, a command under Captain B. A. Byrne, 6th Infantry, attacked and destroyed the robbers' roosts of Bonbong, Sebocao and Tios, located in the mountains of Negros. His loss was one man drowned.

On August 18, the enemy along the Jaro, crossed the river and attacked the 1st Tennessee on our right. Colonel Childers drove them back without loss on our side. Report forwarded.

On August 18, Lieutenant E. T. Cole, 6th Infantry, located a band of insurgents in a strong position in the north of Negros, near Tabaun. In reconnoitering two men were drowned. Dispositions were made for attacking the position on the 19th, which was led by Lieutenants J. V. Heidt and H. A. Hanigan, 6th Infantry. Nineteen of the enemy were killed and 8 rifles captured.

August 23, Lieutenant H. S. Howland, 23d Infantry, was slightly wounded scouting near El Pardo, Cebu.

August 24, a scouting party ran into insurgent band near Cebu and drove them into the mountains, killing six of them.

August 25, four men were attacked between El Pardo and Cebu, and three of them killed.


August 31, Captain B. A. Byrne, 6th Infantry, attacked the robber stronghold of Argogala. Enemy lost twenty-one killed.

August 7, Company A, 6th Infantry, was ordered to Negros.

August 12, Battalion of Philippine Volunteers, recruited by Major Cheatham from discharged men of this district, was organized and sent to Manila.

August 26, Companies A and C, 6th Infantry, were sent to Cebu.

Summary for August.

Killed........................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Rifles captured ................................................. . . . . . . . 8

OUR Loss
Drowned................ .............................................. 3.
Killed.......................................................----------. 3.
Slightly wounded....................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Rifles captured ........................................................ 3.

The 1st Tennessee Volunteers were ordered to United States for muster-out. Up to the hour of being relieved from duty the organization had not lost a man in action, but unfortunately Corporal James Bullington, Company F, exposed himself just before being withdrawn from outpost and was killed. The regiment was to assemble at Cebu, and while there it volunteered to assist in driving the insurgents out of the position they held in the mountains a few miles from that city. In the operations which took place on the 22d and 23d the command was made up of the 1st Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and detachments of the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, and 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry. The enemy were driven from their position, abandoning their cannon and much other material. Enemy's loss, ten killed. Our loss, one man killed and four wounded.

On September 17, Captain G. B. Walker, 6th Infantry, with a mixed detachment from the 6th and 23d Infantry, and 1st Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, attacked insurgents near Maulbaul, Cebu, in intrenched position, and found it necessary to withdraw, after having two men killed and two wounded.

Summary for September

Enemy's loss
Killed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Killed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.
Wounded .............................................................. 6

The 1st 2nd and 3d Battalions, 19th Infantry, reported for duty in the district to replace the outgoing three battalions, 1st Tennessee Volunteer Infantry. The 1st Battalion 3rd Battalion and the Colonel, with headquarters, took station in Cebu, while the 3d Battalion 2nd Battalion was disembarked in Iloilo.

October 1, Captain B. A. Poore, Adjutant, 6th Infantry, with a mixed detachment of his own regiment, consisting of four officers and Ioo men, made a second attack on Tabaun, Negros, which had been re-occupied by the insurgents. The works were taken by assault.

Killed.................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Rifles captured.......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Rounds of ammunition captured............................ ...... 6,000

Lieutenant H. Y. Grubbs, 6th Infantry, killed.
Men wounded................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4


On October 23, Lieutenant W. H. Simons, 6th Infantry, attacked Tulisanes in number in eastern Negros. Three killed and six wounded.

On October 27, Lieutenant H. V. Evans, 6th Infantry, attacked a band of robbers near Castellana, Negros.

In an attack upon robbers at Bais and several night attacks, Lieutenant Colonel B. A. Byrne, 40th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, reports twenty-eight of the enemy killed, and twenty robbers and one rifle captured.


Captain W. P. Evans, 19th Infantry, in making reconnoissance in the Cordellera Central came in contact with the insurgents, killing 7 of them, and had 2 of his command slightly wounded.

Summary for October.

Enemy's loss:
Killed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Men captured....................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Rifles captured. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Killed (Lieutenant Grubbs) ....... 1
Men wounded.................................................... ...... 4

On October 25, the Second First Battalion, 19th Infantry, reported at Iloilo for duty.

On October 27, the Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, reported for duty,

The enemy appeared to finally become aware of the fact that we were doing nothing on Panay but occupying Iloilo and suburbs and supporting efforts in Negros and Cebu, while they sat around as idle spectators, and as the Panay force had been gradually reduced to four battalions, the enemy became somewhat aggressive in action and very much so in words The following note from Colonel Carpenter, 18th Infantry. Commanding Jaro, will explain their attitude at this time.

Carpenter to Mann, Jaro 19

Carpenter, Oct 15 1899


The enemy was given all possible encouragement in his little efforts, for it was very desirable that he should gain enough of confidence to make a stand. During October, the preliminary steps were taken looking to taking the field as soon as the drying up of the roads and rice fields "would justify us in so doing. Sufficient wagons and draught mules had been secured from the quartermaster's department to make a small supply train. This had been added to by modifying the native carts by removing the shafts and putting in poles; making ox yokes and purchasing trotting bulls and so making ox-wagon teams. A pack train fully equipped was gotten for us but the animals were lost at sea and we got only the aparejos, etc. To add to our packing capacity we had bejuco pack-saddles made for out trotting bulls.

In order to secure information, native ponies had been collected for Panay, Jolo and Negros islands and a detachment of fifty men of the 18th Infantry had been mounted as scouts under command of Captain W. H. Gordon and Lieutenant A. L. Conger, 18th Infantry.

Four mountain Hotchkiss cal. 1.65 guns had been procured and formed a part of the command of Light Battery G, 6th Artillery, and of which 1st Lieutenant Louis Ostheim, 6th Artillery, had the immediate command when in the field.

The rains became light and less frequent the latter part of October, and during the first week of November, Captain Gordon and Lieutenant Conger made a careful examination of the roads in the vicinity and found they had become sufficiently hard to carry loaded wagons and orders were issued for moving against the enemy.

The command in Iloilo and suburbs at this time was as follows:

Enlisted for duty.
Light Battery G, 6th U. S. Artillery.............. ................ 103
18th U.S. Infantry.................................................. 1,176
1st and 2d Battalions, 19th U. S. Infantry......................... 794
26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers.................................... 1,233
Total... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,306

The enemy was reported to have about 4,000 men, and he had been digging intrenchments on all available locations from immediately in front of our lines as far back as the foot of the mountains. In organizing for the field, the underlying idea was to have four battalions in two units, thus making each sufficiently strong to operate in two columns at any time when it was found necessary to make a flank movement on a well selected or artificially protected position. In accordance with this idea, four battalions were assigned to Colonel Carpenter's control, consisting of two battalions of his own regiment and two of the 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, under Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, to whom the special care of protecting Iloilo and suburbs was consigned. In addition, Colonel Carpenter was given the battery of 3.2 inch guns of Light Battery G, 6th Artillery. Colonel Rice's command consisted of the 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 19th Infantry, Battalion 26th Infantry, U.S. Volunteers, aud the detachment of Light Battery G, 6th Artillery, which had the Hotchkiss mountain guns.

The insurgents had turned up much of the surface of the island to protect themselves from bullets, and the roads and crossings of streams had all been prepared to obstruct our movements and to give our


troops a warm reception. The right rested, approximately, at Oton and extended over San Miguel, Pavia, Balantang, to the Iloilo Strait, the headquarters being in Santa Barbara.

It was proposed to try and swing around his right and push the crowd down into the manglares of the Dumangas district, and let the navy have a fair opportunity to assist in the good work. To carry this plan into execution it was arranged to send the First Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, and Third Battalion, Eighteenth Infantry, under Major J. F. Huston, Nineteenth Infantry, by water to Tigbauan in the early night of November 9th, covered in landing by the Concord.

The Second Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, and the First Battalion, Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Lieutenant Ostheim's gun detachment and the supplies of both these commands, under the personal direction of Colonel Rice, were to march to Oton via Molo and Arevola. The headquarters, consisting of Captain William A. Mann, Seventeenth Infantry, Acting Adjutant General, First Lieutenant R. H. Van Deman, Twenty-first Infantry, aide-de-camp, Engineer Officer, First Lieut. W. H. Simons, 6th Infantry, Acting Ordnance Officer, and Gordon's Scouts, accompanied this command.

Colonel Carpenter, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 18th Infantry, and the battery of field guns, was to remain in Jaro ready to move, and Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, with the 2d and 3d Battalions, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, was in readiness to assume the duties heretofore in charge of the 18th Infantry, and to support that command if called on. Careful calculation of distances and time had been made, and it was calculated that by noon of the l0th, these six battalions and eight guns could be in supporting distance on the general line, Alimodian, San Miguel and San Jose, connecting with the left of Colonel Dickman's command at Jibaoan. If this movement was successfully executed, it was our expectation by night of that day to occupy a position facing Santa Barbara, the left being about Cabatuan and Carpenter's right near Sta. Teresa. After this movement was set in motion, and when too late to stop it, a typhoon of the most obstinate character visited the island, and although the commands reached the points assigned them for the next morning, it was found during the night that the flood of water poured on us had dissolved the hardened stratum of the roads, and that there was no bottom below that could be reached by man or beast. When this change in conditions became apparent a dispatch was sent by courrier to Major Huston and Colonel Carpenter to stop their movement. The messenger sent to Major Huston overtook him near Cordova and he returned with his command to Tigbauan. The messenger sent to connect with Colonel Carpenter, by telephone and telegraph from Molo, did not succeed in getting his message to him until he had moved out, but it overtook him near Manduriao.

Company —, Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, was sent out by Colonel Dickman to drive in an outpost of the enemy stationed on the right of the road leading from Manduriao to Jibaoan. When Colonel Carpenter reached that vicinity, his two battalions deployed and assisted in clearing the enemy out. His report is forwarded, which shows a loss of one man of the Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, seriously wounded. Enemy's loss, 2 killed, 2 wounded and 3 captured and 1 rifle captured, together with 2,000 rounds of ammunition taken. His wagons had not been able to get a mile from Jaro,


and he returned with his command to that place to wait further orders as directed in the belated dispatch.

As it continued to rain in torrents for some days, the execution of the projected movement was obviously, impossible and a different plan had to be worked out, which would enable the commands to reach their objectives by roadways having better drainage, and bottoms within reasonable reach of the surface. The main road leading from Jaro to Santa Barbara and Cabatuan was pretty well known, and while represented to be in bad condition, it was considered passable. The road leading from Tigbauan to Leon, Alimodian and Maasin, was said to be bad, but with a bottom. It was therefore determined to continue the march from Oton to Tigbauan, with Colonel Rice's command, which was done. Major Huston's Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, and Gordon's scouts, were sent to Leon with instructions to reconnoiter in the direction of Alimodian, Bugo, Cagay and Maasin. Major J. G. Leefe's Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, and Lieutenant Ostheim's battery of mountain guns were sent to Cordova. The other two battalions and the train remaining at Tigbauan until the storm ceased and the result of the reconnoissances was received. Rations for recharging the train were sent by water to Tigbauan. By the 18th the storm showed signs of abating, and the reconoissances having been thoroughly made and having established the fact that the Alimodian road was passable, with some road work and bridge building, it was determined to send the train to Leon, half loaded, under escort of the First Second Battalion, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, and have it return for the balance next day. The orders were issued for a general movement of the command on the morning of the 20th on Alimodian. The enemy had prepared to dispute the crossing of the Sugan. The bridge was gone, and it would be necessary to clear them out before a new one could be built. In order to accomplish this, with as little loss as possible, it was ordered that the battalion of the 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, should move out on the road, followed by the Second Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, coming up from Cordova, and that Major Huston's battalion should cross the mountains and come in on the enemy's right rear, communications being kept up between the commands by means of visual signaling.

The battalion of the 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, came in contact with the enemy at 9:30 on approaching the proposed place of crossing of the Sugan. The enemy's position was exceedingly well chosen for defense, and a frontal attack was not advisable under any point of view. The advance of the 26th Infantry was directed to work cautiously into the timber near the stream and keep under cover, but to shoot when a fair target offered. Communication was opened with Major Huston. His command was progressing finely as proposed, and in due time would come in on the right rear of the enemy's position. In the meantime Gordon's scouts and Major Leefe's Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, were directed to find a crossing on the right and get possession of the hills beyond. As the 26th Battalion advanced, it cleared a commanding hill overlooking the ford opposite to, and about fifteen hundred yards from, the enemy's position. Lieutenant Ostheim suggested that he thought his pack mules could get his mountain guns up the slope, which he succeeded in doing. All these preparatory movements were made in good time, so that when Major Huston opened fire from the right rear the place was quickly aban


doned by the enemy, who retreated over the Alimodian road. I have no reports from the subordinate commanders, but my recollection is that our loss was four of the 26th Infantry wounded, one of whom succumbed. I do not know what the loss of the enemy was, but their reported loss was twenty-six killed. The only capture was one wounded Tagal, who afterward died.

As Colonel Carpenter was still in Jaro under instructions to wait for further orders, Lieutenant A. T. Clifton, signal officer, opened communications with him by heliograph. As the opposition met with by Colonel Rice's troops made it evident that a strong portion of the enemy was in his front, it was accepted as entirely prudent for Colonel Carpenter to attack the force at Pavia. Orders were signalled to him over the heads of the enemy to attack Pavia next morning. Colonel Rice's command was put at work to bridge the Sugan and the battalion, 18th Infantry, brought forward the train. Owing to total lack of proper materials for bridge building, and the scarcity of anything that would answer the purpose at all, the bridge and approaches were not completed until the evening of the 21st, and even then the wagons had to be pulled up the bank by hand. But by 1:30 a. m. on the 22d all had been gotten across and the command moved to Alimodian that day. That town was abandoned by all the inhabitants and no insurgents in sight.

Meanwhile Colonel Carpenter had moved out at daylight of the 21st, following the direct road, taking with him two battalions of his regiment and Captain V. H. Bridgman's battery of field guns. The outpost of the enemy south of the Aganan was strongly posted and had protected itself by constructing strong entrenchments, but it was driven out, our loss being two killed and thirteen wounded. The known loss of the enemy was two killed, two wounded and one captured. The enemy abandoned two small guns and considerable ammunition and powder.

Continuing his work, he found the main body of the insurgents on his front posted on the north bank of the Aganan river, and well prepared to resist his crossing. After preparing the attack, by fire of shrupnel from Captain Bridgman's battery, he advanced against the position and carried it with the losS of one killed (2d Lieutenant Chas. M. Smith, 18th Infantry, and seven wounded. The enemy's known loss being two officers and seventeen men killed and several wounded. Seven pieces of artillery, two of which were breach-loading, were captured with a supply of ammunition.

The command rested that night in Pavia and continued to Santa Barbara the 22d, which place was occupied without resistance. The enemy had abandoned nine old cannon, Filipino flags, etc., and a gang of prisoners. Colonel Carpenter's report is forwarded.

On the 23d, Colonel Rice's command moved out of Alimodian on Maasin, from which place the enemy fled on his approach. The town was abandoned by the entire population. After sending Gordon's scouts to reconnoiter the road to Layog, the command marched on Cabatuan, where it met Lieutenant Colonel W. M. Van Horne, 18th Infantry, who had been sent on reconnoissance from Santa Barbara.

Early in the morning of the 21st, Lieutenant Colonel Dickman crossed the Jaro river with two battalions to entertain the enemy on the left. Major Guy V. Henry, jr., 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, crossed at Jaro with the 1st Battalion and Captain A. A. Barker, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, at La Paz with the 3d Battalion,


26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, and Company L, 6th Infantry, which had returned from Negros. The two battalions converged on the position occupied by the enemy near Bitoon, Major Henry entertaining them on front, while Captain Barker's battalion turned the position. The operation was entirely successful. The enemy were driven out with a loss of twenty-seven killed. The losses on our side were two wounded in Company " L," 6th Infantry, and four wounded in the 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers. Reports enclosed.

After learning the full details at Cabatuan it was decided that Colonel Van Horne, 18th Infantry, should take the direct road from Santa Barbara via Lucina to Pototan and occupy that town; that Colonel Carpenter should return with one battalion to Iloilo and embark on the Elcano with supplies for the joint command, and sail to the north of the Tinorian and establish a depot from which Colonel Rice's command could draw future supplies.

Colonel Rice's command moved out the next day (24th) for Janiuay. The insurgents destroyed the bridges, which caused much delay to the command and much labor for the engineer officer. The most serious break was that of the bridge spanning the arroyo Tigbauan, but by hard work and good fortune everything was in Janiuay before night. The enemy had moved out and made room for the quartering of the command. The pursuit was continued, the 25th, to Lambunao. There were five bridges to be rebuilt in the nine miles, and much work necessary in minor repairs. The scouts, the mountain battery and three battalions had pushed through to Lambunao in the afternoon. In doing so the evidences were quite convincing that the enemy were pressed, as they were killing too many carabao to be accounted for in any other way. Lambunao was deserted by all inhabitants. The insurgent's arsenal had been dismantled and masses of papers, foodstuffs, etc., had been abandoned. The time seemed ripe for making a push to force an action out of the fleeing enemy. The troops in Lambunao would have no rations after breakfast next morning. A visit to the bridge-builders and train found all going well, but a very trying finishing contract in building a new bridge over the arroyo Abangay. Lieutenant Van Deman expected to have it finished by 2 a.m. next morning and so put the supplies in Lambunao-by 3:30. But it so happened that cutting bridge materials at night by the light of a candle lantern, by men greatly fatigued, was slower work than estimated, and the supplies did not come in until seven o'clock in the morning. Notwithstanding the disappointment at not being able to cover a march in the cool of the morning it was decided to fill the haversacks of Gordon's scouts, Ostheim's battery, Huston's and Warwick's battalions and make a try for a fight, leaving Colonel Rice with two battalions and train to follow as rapidly as roads would justify. Getting off at 8 a. m. the command reached Calinog by noon, and was given a rest while the scouts took a look up Tapas pass to see if any new developments might be discovered. Calinog having been deserted by the people, information from that source was not obtainable. At 2 p. m., although Gordon had not returned, it was determined to push out for Passi. The advance guard consisted of the signal officer and the two aides-decamp, and later one of the scouts appeared from somewhere and put himself out as a point. Huston's battalion was in the lead, then Ostheim's battery and Warwick's battalion. The point and the advance guard rode into the enemy at the crossing of the Lamunang, near Passi. Huston


developed his battalion to the front, right and left of the road, while Lieutenant Ostheim located his battery on an elevation overlooking the crossing and the town. At this moment Gordon reported the arrival of his scouts, who were sent to the right and across the Jalaur. Warwick developed two companies on the left and held two companies subject to disposition. The attack was so sudden and so unexpected that before the insurgents could get into formation our troops were in their midst. Gordon had cut off one section on the Dingle road and Warwick had sent another over the Dumarao pass, while Huston had driven the center straight through for Abacd. The troops had time to get possession of the town when night came on, rendering any further efforts in this region of no roads and bottomless morasses utterly impossible. The chief of staff of the insurgents' commander has since informed me that they were holding a conference as to the dispositions to be made for resistance the next day when the firing began. The result was that their forces were utterly broken up, part taking the road leading to Dingle, part the pass over the mountains to Capiz and part over the mountain trail to Concepcion. Their loss has been reported as nineteen killed; some guns, fifteen rifles and fourteen horses were taken. We were so unfortunate as to lose two killed, one of whom was a battalion commander, Captain Warwick, 18th Infantry. His loss was greatly felt by the entire command.

Colonel Rice reached Passi with the train on the evening of the 27th. The scattering of the enemy the day before had cleared the province of Iloilo of organized bodies of insurgents, and it was decided to send Colonel Rice to Iloilo to occupy the province with his regiment, to protect property arid preserve order. The 2d Battalion of the 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, was ordered to proceed, on the morning of the 28th, to Jaro. The instructions given Colonel Rice were to occupy Leon, Cabatuan, Pototan, Sara and such other points as might be found necessary for the preservation of order, and to select commanders from the various commands of occupation, who would bring a sound judgment to bear on the various troublesome questions likely to arise.

Summary for November.

Killed..................................................---------------. 95
Wounded....................................................----------. t;
Captured.......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.
Rifles captured......................................................... 21
Guns captured.......................................................... 18

Killed......................................... . . . . . . . . . . ...----------- 5
Wounded............................................................... 31

It was decided to continue the campaign by crossing the mountains into Capiz province, with the following troops: Gordon's Scouts, Lieutenant Ostheim's Battery, Captain Shank's (late Captain Warwick's) Battalion, 18th Infantry, Major Leefe's and Major Huston's Battalions, 19th Infantry. The pass over the mountains is a very difficult one and no wheels could be taken. We had succeeded in getting enough aparejos for our pack mules. The train discharged all subsistence supplies still on hand and was sent to Pototan under escort of Captain Shank's Battalion, 18th Infantry, where it was to park the wagons and load the


animals with packs of further supplies, and return to Passi. The other troops of this command were to remain at Passi and put the trail in condition for four or five miles out, look into the conditions at San Enrique, and drive the detachment of insurgents out of Abacá and destroy the remnants of the arsenal which the insurgents had dragged from Maasin, dropping parts from time to time by the way. Colonel Carpenter was directed to embark a battalion of his command on the transport Blcano and proceed to Banate where a portion of it would be disembarked and take up the trail from Abaca to Lemery at San Rafael, while the balance would be disembarked at Ajui, and proceed to Sara, the time being calculated so that the two commands would meet at Sara. The projected plans worked out to a nicety. Colonel Rice took possession of the province promptly, Major Huston knocking the few insurgents out of Abaca in time for the 18th Infantry to strike them near Sara, killing an officer and man and capturing some horses.

The mountain command left Passi on the morning of December 5, with ten days' rations and the reserve ammunition on pack animals, mules, bulls and carabao. No opposition was offered until after crossing the divide, when incomplete defensive works were first met, and finally a detachment of insurgents opened fire on our advance from a fine position to the left and front, and on the left or opposite bank of the Tagabon. The scouts and advance guard aided by Captain Lewis's Company, 18th Infantry, put them to flight in a few moments, and the command and part of the pack train reached Dumarao that evening. Lieutenant B. H. Wells, 18th Infantry, field quartermaster and commissary, with his train was struggling with the difficulties of the trail and did not get in until the next day.

On the 6th, the main command continued its march to Cuartero, leaving a guard in Dumarao to bring on the train to Dao next day. Cuartero was vacated by the inhabitants. The following day the command reached Dao, which the inhabitants had not vacated. The train came in and all was in normal condition. An effort was made to find passable trails by which battalions could be sent to the right and left, for Diocno was still in Capiz and it was hoped he would not be able to get out. Unfortunately the seasons of heavy rains are not contemporaneous on the two sides of the mountains and Capiz province was still flooded with water, and plenty more falling from day to day. The trails to Sapian and Maayon were found to be utterly impracticable, and it was necessary to follow the main road down the Panay the next day as far as Panitan from which point it was possible for footmen, in fine physical condition, to make their way to Ivisan on the left, and Pontevedra on the right. The morning of the 8th, Major Huston crossed the Panay with the able-bodied men of his battalion and marched to Pontevedra, while Captain Shanks with the like men of his battalion took the trail to the left and marched to Ivisan, and the headquarters, scouts, battery, Leefe's battalion, the sick and weak of the detached battalions and the train, followed the main road to Loctugan. The following day the command concentrated at Capiz, to find that Diocno had sailed off and no one could be found who would tell whither he had gone. Romblon, Batangas, Calivo and Ibajay were all given as his objective. Some said he went in one small vessel and others that he had seven. It was finally concluded that none of them were knowingly telling the truth, except as to the date of his departure, which all agreed was on the evening of the yth.


During this time Colonel Carpenter had followed the coast of Concepcion with the transport Elcano, while a battalion of his command covered that territory and found no enemy after leaving Sara. He finally embarked his battalion at Estancia and arrived off Capiz on the morning of the I2th.

In examining the documents captured in Capiz it was found that Romblon seemed to be a distributing center for the insurgents, and having examined the situation on a previous occasion, it was determined to take the place and put a small garrison, and, incidentally, keep Diocno traveling, if it should so happen that he had gone there. I should have stated that Captain Ackley with his naval warship had come to the mouth of the Panay on the night of the 11th in order to be within hail "to lend a hand" should opportunity offer. He offered to accompany the troops to Romblon and clear the way for their landing. Two companies of Major Paul's Battalion, 18th infantry, were ordered to remain on the transport, and Colonel Carpenter disembarked, taking with him the headquarters and two companies of the battalion. He was assigned to the command of the city of Capiz, and such military dependent stations as might be established in that province.

Major Huston was directed to take command o£ the scouts, one platoon of the mountain battery, his own battalion and the train and return to Iloilo by way of Tapas and Colinog pass, which he duly accomplished by much determination and hard work.

One platoon of the mountain battery and Major Leefe's Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, were directed to hold themselves in readiness to embark for Cebu on notice, and the transport Elcano then sailed on the evening of December 15 for Romblon, carrying Companies C and D, 18th Infantry, under command of Captain M. McFarland and Lieutenant H. B. Fiske, 18th Infantry, with the Concord as guide. We arrived off Romblon harbor on the morning of the i6th, and after examining the situation a landing was effected under the protection of the guns of the Concord. The navy gunboat P^mpanga towed one section of landing boats and the launch of the Concord the other. While approaching the place selected for the landing the enemy opened fire from various points and succeeded in killing one of our men and severely wounding one of the sailors of the Pampanga. The Concord meantime opened fire on the trenches in which the insurgents were concealed and the rapidity of the running caused thereby was quite remarkable. In thirty minutes from the firing of the first shot Lieutenant Fiske was seen hauling down the insurgent flag, which they did not stop to get.

After landing supplies for this new garrison we returned to Capiz and picked up Major Leefe's Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, and one platoon of the mountain battery and transferred them to Cebu, and returned to Iloilo on December 21.

On arriving at Iloilo, it was found that Negros had been greatly disturbed during December.

Before severing communication with the office, the subdistrict commander had been notified that the plans of campaign might result in a few people seeking refuge on Negros. As an obstacle to such a current a company was sent to Guimaras to prevent the use of that island as a stepping stone on the way. across. The gunboats were notified of


the probabilities and were on the qui vive, but notwithstanding these precautions some forty to sixty insurgents, with rifles and cartridges, managed to escape to Negros.

In addition to the landing of the Tagal fugitives from Panay. delegates from the junta at Hong Kong had reached Negros to preach a crusade against the provisional civil government, which had been established on the island, and had succeeded in getting some following, and had in embryo a project for overthrowing the authorities and expelling the troops. Their schemes were closely watched and the subdistrict commander was well advised of what was going on.

Lieutenant Ledyard, 6th Infantry, was sent out with a detachment to occupy Maao as a point of observation. In scouting about he was fortunate enough to find the whole combined force of sixty-three rifles and three hundred and twenty macheteros at Hacienda Palencia. Lieutenant Ledyard had fifteen soldiers and ten natives with which he attacked at once and drove the revolutionists from their chosen position into a camarin in rear. He then prepared and engaged in an attack on the camarin, when he was killed by a rifle ball. One native police was also killed. The command having fallen to Corporal Purcell, he retired the command and reported to Lieutenant Colonel Byrne, at Carlota. It was subsequently ascertained that the revolutionists lost sixteen killed in Lieutenant Ledyard's attack.

On December 8 an attack was made on the detachment in Ginigaran (Sergeant Brown, 6th Infantry, and n men). The attacking force is reported as sixty rifles and two hundred and fifty macheteros. The fight was kept up from 3 p.m. until daybreak the next morning, when the enemy vanished, leaving three dead.

The babaylones seeing their neighbors fully entertained, concluded they would come down and glean. Sergeant Roeder, 6th Infantry, with twenty men and twenty native police, happened to be unoccupied at the time and allowed these people to come within two hundred yards of him when he opened fire and killed twenty-eight.

Colonel Rice, in compliance with instructions, had spread his regiment over the province of Iloilo, and had invited the towns to organize their municipal governments and get their public schools in operation, and have the lines of communication put in passable condition. These things were strenuously objected to by the wandering insurgents, now known as ladrones. This metamorphosis was simple. The insurgents invited the mountain robbers of Negros and Panay to join their forces, which some of them did. When the organizations were broken up these babaylanes and pulajans went back to their former occupation, plus a rifle and supply of ammunition. But some organized corps of insurgents still held together, and one of these made an effort against Captain C. M. Brownell's Company, 26th Infantry, United States Volunteers, at Sara. The troops were taken entirely by surprise, but promptly seized their arms and assumed the offensive, driving their assailants out with heavy loss. Captain Brownell's report is enclosed.

On December 28, Captain Fred McDonald, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, reported a skirmish with ladrones near Guimbal in which the enemy suffered a loss of fourteen killed. During these worries, the local commanders were not in communication with the district commander and not being satisfied with the action of his representative, called on corps headquarters for additional troops, so that on his return to Iloilo he found a battalion of the 44th Infantry, U. S. Vol


unteers, going to Negros and the balance of the regiment about to arrive. The destination of the regiment was as follows: 1st Battalion, Sub-district of Negros; ad Battalion, Panay; headquarters, band and 3d Battalion, went to Subdistrict of Cebu. The aggregate strength of the brigade was now just 8,000.

Summary for December.

ENEMY's Loss.
killed................................................. 88

Killed............. ............................... -------------------- 1
Wounded...................................................---------- 3

When the additional battalion was taken to Cebu in December, the commanding officer of that sub-district was instructed to clear the insurgents out of the Sudlon mountains. He asked for another battalion of troops, which he was promptly told he could not have, and measures were taken to put two commands in the field to accomplish the job. One consisting of three companies, 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Major H. B. McCoy, 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, commanding, and three companies of 19th Infantry and one of the 23d Infantry, Major T. C. Woodbury, 19th Infantry, commanding, was under the personal direction of Colonel E. J. McClernand, 44th U. S. Volunteers. The second, or turning column, consisted of a battalion of the 19th Infantry under Major J. G. Leefe. The operation was given to Colonel McClernand. The insurgents did not wait to contest possession of the mountain tops but cut and ran on the approach of the troops. Our losses as reported appear to have been two men of the 19th Infantry wounded, and the loss of the enemy ten killed. (All reports of subordinate commanders enclosed).

Major McCoy pursued the fugitives down the west side of the mountains and finally reached Balamban on the coast. He took eight of the enemy prisoners.

This operation completed the occupation of all the provinces in the district of the Visayas with the exception of Antique, in Panay. On the 2d of January the companies of the 6th Infantry in Cebu were returned to Panay and it was decided to make up a mixed command at Iloilo and cross the mountains into Antique by the mountain passes, which might result in getting an engagement out of the enemy, and so contribute to their education. The project was as follows: Gordon's scouts, two mountain guns of Battery G, 6th Artillery, under Lieutenant R. H. McMaster, 6th Artillery; two and a half companies of the 6th Infantry under Captain G. B. Walker, 6th Infantry, were sent down the coast road with a pack train. On the day they reached San Joaquiu, Major Huston's Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, was put on board the Elcano at Iloilo and landed at San Joaquin with supplies for his battalion and Captain Walker's.

The same day Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Scott, 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, with three companies of his regiment, was to go by land transportation to Igbaras, where he would abandon his wagons and proceed by the trail leading over the mountains to Bago. The intention being to have his command meet the enemy, which Major Huston's command was expected to run out of San Jos£ de Buena Vista and Sibalon. Major Huston's command succeeded in crossing the range and reaching La Granja on the lyth. Colonel Scott was struggling


that night with the difficulty of the trail on the upper Taugian. Early on the morning of the 18th the enemy was located in a well chosen and fully prepared position on the Antique river, the passage of which they seemed inclined to dispute.

During the night the gunboats Concord and Pampanga had arrived off, and when the ball opened our enemies found that the co-operating forces could, under favorable- circumstances, make it hot in the old town. They had built heavy rifle-pits on the thither bank of the river and had prepared positions for infantry and artillery on a rough mountain side shooting out on the hither side at right angles. Major Huston allowed the people along the river to be entertained by the gunboats while he attacked the mountain flank with all his force. He brushed this away in half an hour, capturing two guns, one being a Nordenfeldt machine gun. also some prisoners. Having driven out their left, he was able to cross the river without opposition and so envelop the right of the enemy, if they stayed, which they did not do.

Huston pushed for Sibalon via Engaña, and, although the whole country was dug up in making artificial protection for defense, not a shot was fired. The entire population of Sibalon had fled and the evidences were that the military contingent had gone very hurriedly. Gordon's scouts pushed them well up towards Remigio, and it was hoped that Colonel Scott would have an opportunity to hit them an effective blow, but they learned at San Remigio of Colonel Scott's approach from Bogo and buried their ammunition, permitting their Spanish prisoners to escape, and scattered in the mountains right and left. Major Huston's battalion was left at San Josd with instructions to clear the country of insurgents and to keep order in the province and have municipal governments organized, and public schools put in operation. Lieutenant Colonel Scott arrived in San Jos£ with a good many men greatly exhausted. He was instructed to put two hundred of his men, physically fit, on board the transport Elcano and run up the coast and disembark at Colasi and let his command rest until the arrival of the scouts, mountain guns and Captain Walker's battalion, who were on the march up the shore. These commands assembled at Colasi, Captain Walker's battalion having left the main road but once, at Tibiao. Information was given that the insurgents had a force and an arsenal up the Tibiao river in the vicinity of arroyo Cuinabou, and a reconnoissance was sent out under Captain Gordon, but nothing more than a subsistence supply of rice was found. At Colasi native carriers were employed, and Lieutenant Colonel Scott's command was directed to take the trail by Panin gayon mountain to the vicinity of Libacao and Madalag, on the Aclan, and follow the valley to Calivo. Captain Walker was sent with two companies of his battalion on the transport Elcano to Pandan with instructions to push out at once to Santa Ana, at which place it was reported the fugitives were assembling. After accomplishing his mission he was to return to Pandan. The scouts, mountain guns and train, under Captain Gordon, followed the coast road to Pandau. Captain Walker found nothing but subsistence supplies at Santa Ana and, having returned to Pandan, marched with the combined command through Santa Cruz pass to Navas, Ibajay, Macata and Calivo. The marches of Captain Walker's and Colonel Scott's command were calculated carefully and it was hoped they would arrive at Calivo about the same time. On the approach of Gordon's scouts the insurgents fled up the Aclan valley, but Colonel


Scott had met with greater obstacles than had been allowed for, and had thus lost a day, and the fugitives scattered in the mountains. Colonel Scott met no opposition except at the fording of the river near Madalag when he was opened on by a small band of possibly twenty rifles, which had selected a position on the mountain side and had obtained the range, and before the command could be gotten under cover and open fire, one man was wounded. A few volleys scattered the enemy, and Colonel Scott joined with his command at Calivo the following day. After scouting the country and securing certain information as to the possibility of landing supplies for a command at Lagatic, by way of Puerto de Batan, Major Walker was directed to remain in Calivo and given command of two companies of the 6th Infantry with which to keep the vicinity clear of insurgents. Lieutenant Colonel Scott's command was greatly exhausted by the exceptional hardships it had to overcome on the mountain trail, and was embarked on the transport Elcano for Iloilo. Captain Gordon was directed to return overland with his scouts, the mountain Kuns, and the train with which Lieutenant C. N. Purdy, 6th Infantry, and a half company of the 6th Infantry was assigned as escort. Captain Gordon's instructions were, that on arriving at Novas the scouts should continue around the coast of the cape shooting out on the northwestern point of the island and ascertain the condition of the towns, harbors, etc., and meet the train at Pandan. The escort of the train was fired upon in coming through the pass and had one man killed. Captain Gordon assembled the command at Pandan and continued his march down the coast. On my arrival at Iloilo a 'eport was received from Major Huston that the enemy had shown too much strength about Bugason and Valderrama for his means, and instructions were sent Captain Gordon to report to him with his command on arrival at San José de Buenavista. Major Huston moved out to Cangaranon, sending Lieutenant G. I. Feiter, 19th Infantry, with a detachment to hold the pass between Bogo and Valderrama. The enemy was found on the opposite side of the Cangaranon river. After some skirmishing Major Huston concluded that his three companies, the mounted scouts and the mountain guns were not strong enough to meet the situation, and returned with his command to San José de Buenavista and recalled Lieutenant Feiter's detachment. In these operations Major Huston had one man killed and three wounded. Lieutenant Feiter had two men wounded. Captain Gordon then continued his march to Iloilo, arriving in due time without incident.

In Concepción Lieutenant Colonel W. M. Van Horne, 18th Infantry, sent out commands from time to time, the most successful of which was one made to Pili, Colasi, etc., by Captain C. M. Brownell, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, and Lieutenant O. E. Hunt, 18th Infantry, in which the reports show ten insurgents killed and still more captured.

Colonel Carpenter having been promoted, Major C. R. Paul, 18th Infantry, as commanding officer at Capiz, sent out . commands from time to time on such information as he could obtain, but no marked advantage was obtained.

In the sub-district of Negros, Lieutenant Colonel Byrne, 40th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers (Captain, 6th Infantry), commanding in the Carlota district, succeeded in surprising a band of revolutionists in hiding in the mountains, and his report accounts for twenty-two of the enemy killed and twenty eight rifles captured.


Summary for January.

Killed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................................. 42
Captured................................................................ 10

Killed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................................ 2
Wounded ..................................... 7

By the 1st of February the enemy seemed to be so broken up that a platoon could go almost anywhere in the district except in the Antique province, where they held to their organization, which was peculiar, but excellently adapted to the peculiarities of the terrain. They had but ten companies to protect this entire shoestring of a province, which extends along one hundred and twenty miles of sea coast and has an almost impenetrable range of mountains as a backing along almost the entire length, lowering only in the north and south extremities. The spurs from the main range give excellent points for observation and far-reaching signals, anda force that is spread along the province in sections can be concentrated in an almost incredible short space of time.

Lieutenant O. E. Hunt, 18th Infantry, made a successful raid on Carlos, Province of Concepcion, on the night of February 2d, and captured the insurgent governor, with his guard, some rifles, etc. This seems to have been the closing act with the insurgents in that comandaucia, as all the disturbances there, since, appear to have been caused by robbers.

On the night of the 11th, Major E. D. Anderson, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, with a small command surprised the quarters of Martin Delgado, but only succeeded in capturing his morganatic wife.

On February 19th, Captain M. C. Raysor, 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, made a night attack on Quintin Sallas and Joaquin de la Pena, in which some execution was done.

On the 20th, Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, made a dash on the insurgents in the mountains east of Dingle.

On the 22d, Lieutenant F. C. Bolles, 6th Infantry, with seventy-five men, was attacked on the march near Tangolan by 150 Tagals, who had chosen a position where he could not reach them. Lieutenant Bolles and three men were wounded.

Sergeant Wysor, Nineteenth Infantry, had a skirmish with insurgents near Danao, Cebu, on the 25th, in which he lost two wounded and three missing.

Early in March, Major H. C. Hale, 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, with two companies, 44th Infantry, were withdrawn from the sub-district of Negros for the occupation of Bohol, but before sending the command to its ultimate destination it was determined that it should go to aid Major Huston in Antique, to make a clearing up of the situation about Valderrama where he was being annoyed. Major Huston moved from San Jose de Buenavista, on the 8th, on Valderrama via Sibalon, Cuyapiao and Ignoy, while Major Hale's Battalion was landed at Bugason and moved on Valderrama by the direct line. The commands met at the objective, finding that the enemy had fled. Major Huston met some opposition and had one man mortally wounded. On the 6th, Lieutenant Colonel Scott, with three companies of the 44th, projected a movement against an organized body of insurgents who had taken refuge in the Dumangas manglares. Captain


M. C. Raysor's company succeeded in stumbling upon their hiding place on the 6th, and also in driving them out and burning their quarters, barracks and supplies. Only three were known to have been killed.

On March 22, Lieutenant A. S. Brookes, 18th Infantry, with Company L, had an affair with some Tagalogs near Cabug Cabug, in Capiz province, in which eighteen of the enemy were killed and four wounded and captured. Following up the discomfited enemy with fifty of his company, he succeeded in bringing them to a second action on the 23d, near Pilar, in which eight more of the enemy were killed. Company L, lost one corporal killed, one sergeant mortally wounded and one private slightly wounded. Taking the two days' work as a whole, L Company seems to have first place in the district up to date.

The sub-district of Negros has been undisturbed.

In the sub-district of Cebu, Major McCoy, 44th Infantry. U. S. Volunteers, found a band of insurgents intrenched near Guinon on the 11th and scattered them, with a loss of five in their strength.

On the 31st, the same officer found the force of General Verdeflor and succeeded in killing him and five of his followers. On the 22d, Lieutenant G. S. Goodale, 23d Infantry, stumbled upon a band of insurgents, in the night, near Guadalupe church and inflicted some loss on it. In these affairs eight rifles were captured.

On the 17th, Major Hale, 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, landed in the island of Bohol and took possession of Tagbilaran without any resistance beyond that of a written protest read by the insular presidente. Major Hale's instructions were to disseminate the command over the island as tiltdevelopment of conditions would justify.

Summary for March.

Killed 29
Wounded nn<1
captured 5

Killed •>
Wounded 1

On the 2Qth of March by General Orders, No. 38, A. G. O., the Visayan Military District and First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps was discontinued and a Department of the Visayas, created. The undersigned was designated as commander of the new department and assumed the command on the igth of April. The new department consisted of the former district of the Visayas, plus the islands of Samar and Leyte. The department was divided into four districts, as follows:—

First Pistrict—IsliindB of Samar and Leyte; Colonel Arthur Murray,
43rd Infnntrv, U. S. Volunteers, conimnnding.

Second District—Islands of Cebu and Bohol; Colonel E. J. McCIcrtmnd.
14th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, commanding.

Third District—It-binds of Negron and Siqui.ior; Brigadier General
James F. £mith, U. S. Volunteers, commanding.

Fourth District—Islands of Pnnay anil Gninmrns; Colonel E. Rlee,
2Cth Infantry, U. H. Volunteers, commanding.

The day the order assuming command was issued, a four days' struggle of directed skill against a leaderless mob was fortunately ended at Catubig, a nipa village in the island of Samar, located on the banks of the river Catubig, which flows north and empties into the Straits of San Bernardino at Lagnan. A detachment of thirty-one men had been placed


at Catubig and left without an officer. Being inexperienced and new to the service, and finding themselves surrounded by great odds, they assumed a strictly defensive attitude in their barracks, which permitted the enemy to approach under cover and set their barracks on fire and so expel them. They then crossed the plaza and attempted, apparently, to embark in native boats, whether to cross the river or sail down it is not known. In this effort about half the detachment, including the two sergeants with it, were killed, and Corporal Carson, Company H, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, found himself in charge. He chose a defensive position where he could keep his men under cover, and with the few remaining men gallantly stood the enemy off for two days and nights, until Lieutenant Sweeney with a dozen men finally reached them and brought them away. Our loss in this disastrous affair was nineteen killed and three wounded. The loss suffered by the enemy is not known.

After assuming command, a visit to Samar and Leyte developed the fact that the 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, which constituted the entire force of the district, had undertaken more than they could accomplish. The situation demanded more troops than could be extracted from the other districts, but it seemed practicable to secure enough for the over-running of one of these islands at a time. With this policy in view, one company was withdrawn from Samar which was not required there while in a purely defensive status; two companies of the 23d U. S. Infantry were drawn from the second district and two of the 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, from the third district and sent to Leyte. These troops having arrived, the enemy under Moxica was attacked April 26, at La Paz, by Major L. C. Andrews, 43d Infantry. U. S. Volunteers, with a mixed command composed of companies of the 23d Infantry, 43d and 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers. Moxica's people were routed, abandoning their guns and much other material. Our loss, two killed and eleven wounded; enemy's loss, not known. In the second district Major McCoy, 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, found a detachment of the enemy at Alegria on April 22 and reports having killed twelve of them. The third district reports all quiet. In the fourth district, Major Anderson, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, stirred up an organized Tagalo outfit in northwest I1oilo on April 17. They had fixed themselves in an almost unapproachable position, but by destroying their source of supplies he worked them out with the loss in his command of four wounded.

Summary for April.

Killed................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Wounded................................................... . . . . . . . . . 5

Killed.............................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Wounded............................................................... 9

In the first district, Major Andrews, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, attacked Hilongos, Leyte, on May 6, with a mixed command of the 23d Infantry and 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, and took the town by assault. He captured quite a number of guns and fourteen rifles. Enemy's loss, eighty-four killed, and twenty-one wounded; our loss, four wounded.


May 24, Captain Prescott, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, attacked enemy at Pasigoy; Enemy's loss, three killed; our loss, two wounded.

May 25, Lieutenant C. E. Estes, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, attacked the enemy at Alangalang. Enemy's loss, twelve killed; our loss, nil.

May 26, enemy attacked Catbalogan. Enemy's loss, ten; our loss, nil.

May 26, Captain J. S. Fair, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, attacked town near Jibatang. Enemy's loss, eight killed; our loss, nil.

May 29, Lieutenant J. N. Truden, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, was attacked in Palo. Enemy's loss, twelve killed, our own loss, one wounded.

Second district, Lieutenant F. G. Stritzinger, 23d Infantry, made an active scout in southern Cebu and found an enemy. Succeeded in bringing him to a fight and reports killing five. He had one man wounded.

Third district, all quiet.

Fourth district, Lieutenant A. E. Brookes, 18th U. S. Infantry, made an expedition through Capiz province, via Jagnaya, Jamindon and Madalag. In the Aclan -valley he was joined by a force from Calivo under Captain C. G. Morton, 6th U. S. Infantry, and the two commands co-operated against what was reported as three hundred rifles, to the west of Molinao and Macato, but were unable to bring the enemy to bay. Some long range firing and the destruction of shelter and supplies was the best that could be effected.

Lieutenant Colonel Scott, 44th Infantry, U.S. Volunteers, was sent to Antique with the 2d battalion of his regiment to take charge of that province and strengthen the force there. He found Fullon endeavoring to disturb the garrisons about San Jose, and at once took the field. In some skirmishing that occurred near Patnongan our troops had two noncommissioned officers killed and a private wounded. The loss of the enemy, not known. (Report enclosed.)

Ibajay and Pandan were occupied. Found the enemy on the loth instant and ran him out. (Report enclosed.) Captain Gordon, with the scouts dismounted, and Company H, 18th Infantry; was sent over the mountains from Miagao into Antique to disturb the enemy from the rear. (His report enclosed.)

Colonel Salazar, chief of staff of General Fullon, and Major Adriatico of the staff of Diocno, came to visit me to ascertain what could be done toward coming to a peaceable settlement of our quarrel. They remained some days and were told they would find no fault in the liberality of tbe terms after they surrendered their arms, but we did not make terms with armed enemies. As usual they did not have any clear idea of what they wanted beyond "independence." The preliminary step on our part as prescribed for establishing municipal governments was shown them, also the plan for organizing the judicial system. They expressed themselves as fully content, personally, with the policy of our Government, but that they needed something more to enable them to carry their followers with them. As we had nothing more to offer except powder and lead, they were sent to their respective commanders and their reports made. The finale was a personal letter from Colonel Salazar, saying that General Orders No. 40 was good enough so far as it went, but it was only a military order which could be revoked at any time.


Summary for May.

Killed 184
Wounded 21

Killed 2
Wounded 8

On the night of June 2 the opening of a new effort which had been in preparation for some months was initiated by an attack on the garrison of Baratoc Nuevo, which consisted of ci platoon of the 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Lieutenant H. M. Fales, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, commanding. The attack was a surprise, and three men were wounded before the men could turn out and equip, but Lieutenant Fales took the offensive at once, in his pajamas, and after he had gotten his rifles going he had no more men hurt in his command and the assailants were driven off promptly. This was followed the following night by an attack on the detachment in Pavia, which was protected by a section in charge of a sergeant of the 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers. The presidente of the town had been wounded before the sergeant was made aware of what was going on, but he made short work of the assailants when notified, killing four of them. Then followed an attack on Dumangas. On the 5th it had become apparent that the insurgents were assembling in the vicinity of Dumangas, and Captain F. H. Peck, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, was sent with sixty men to re-enforce the platoon already there under Lieutenant R. L. Fernald, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers. Captain Peck met some opposition on his march between Baroloc Nuevo and Dumangas, and on arrival announced his intentions of burning the town. At the hour designated he started the fire on the lee side of the church and convent which was used as his barrack. At this the enemy opened on him with rifle and torch, but they lighted their fires to the windward of the church and convent and succeeded in burning both. This drove Captain Peck's command into the plaza where he remained until the next day and then, after destroying all property that he could not take with him, he marched his command to Barotoc Nuevo. He had one man killed and one had an arm broken. On the gth an attack was made on Maasin, where Captain E. I*. Butts, 18th Infantry, took the offensive with vigor, and reports killing fourteen and capturing thirteen, without loss on his side.

On June 15, Captain S. Burkhardt, igth Infantry, found the enemy near Nalupa Nuevo, Antique, and brought him to action, inflicting some loss, but just the extent of it he does not state except as estimated.

On my return from Leyte, directions were given Lieutenant A. L. Conger, 18th Infantry, then in command of Gordon's scouts, to proceed at once to the vicinity of Dumangas and locate the enemy. He finally found them, or they found him, on the line of the old bed of the Jalaur. The enemy had at least twenty to one of Conger's force present, but fortunately not one half of the number had rifles. Their line was so long that Lieutenant Conger could not attack it all, so he broke through the center and scattered the line, but in so doing he had a man mortally wounded and he could not take care of his wounded man and continue the action, so he drew off with one insurgent captain as an evidence


of where he had been, leaving six of the enemy dead on the field as an evidence to them that he had been there.

Having found where the enemy were hibernating, a command was made up of the scouts and provost guard under command of Captain John Hickey, 26th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, to clear them out, and the district commander was directed to send a company to re-occupy Dumangas, which was done.

Captain Hickey had to fight his way up the river, but had but one man wounded. He reports having killed seven of the enemy.

Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Scott, 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, did some excellent work in Antique and northwestern Capiz during the month, but his reports have been forwarded without the data being noted.

In the third district all had been quiet.

In the second district, Lieutenant W. W. Fiscus, igth Infantry, found an enemy and had a few shots, killing six of them without loss to himself.

In the first district, on the night of June 8, the eneni}attacked Catbalogan. Result: Enemy's loss, two killed, one prisoner; our loss, nil.

June 10, the enemy attacked Tanatan with eighteen riflemen and four hundred bolomen. Driven off with loss ol seventy-two killed; our loss, nil.

On June 12, Major Gilmore, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, had a skirmish near Calbayog in which the enemy lost two killed; our loss, nil.

June 13, Captain W. L. Goldsborough, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, was attacked at Dagami. Enemy driven off. Enemy's loss, three killed, one wounded, thirty prisoners; our loss, nil.

June 14, Lieutenant C. E. Estes, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, attacked the enemy eight miles west of Jaro and scattered them. Enemy's loss, eight killed; our loss, nil. June 14, Lieutenant J. N. Truden’s command attacked enemy near Malenong and scattered them. Enemy's loss, seven killed and ten prisoners; our loss, nil.

Summary for June.

enemy’s Loss.
Killed ......................................... ---------------------- 141
Wounded ........................................ . . . . . . . . . . ... ------ 1.
Prisoners................................................. ------------- 54

Killed......................................................... ------- 1
Wounded .......................... .........................--------. g

Summary for the Year.

Killed................................................----------------- sui
Wounded .............................. ........... ........ ---------- 38
Captured.............................................................. 100

Killed .........................................................------. 40
Drowned ........................................................------ s
Wounded................................................ ------------. **

Early in the summer of 1899 it became evident that something would have to be done to relieve the anxieties of the people of Negros. The provisional government had formulated and submitted for approval a constitution under which they thought their happiness might be furthered. It was forwarded to the United states, but no action had


been taken and could not be taken for some time. The Military Governor formulated a plan for a representative provisional government which was published in General Orders, No. 30, serious 1899, and directed to be put in operation. In this order it was provided that a civil government and council should be chosen by the people. General Smith was chosen by the then Military Governor of the archipelago—General Otis—to carry out the provisions of the order. The choice proved to be an exceptionally happy one, and General Smith's work has given very general satisfaction. After receiving the order, he had a careful registration made of those entitled to the right of the franchise under the conditions specified. This registration showed that there were between five and six thousand voters. The poll lists were made out and an election was duly held on the zd day of October for a civil governor and an advisor}' council. The election went off quietly and although the count developed the fact that the popular vote had given them a surprise, still there was no trouble whatever, and on the 6th of November the governor and council were inducted into their offices. In December the agents of the insurrectionary party in the archipelago undertook the organization and development of a revolution in Negros. The ruthless handling they received in a few collisions with the 6th Infantry satisfied them that somebody had blundered and they gave up the effort. Since that time Negros has been at peace and all the island industries have been pursued with confidence in their present safety and future prosperity.

In Panay all the important towns on the coast are occupied by our troops, and the two great rice-producing valleys, lloilo and Panay, are fairly protected. The thirty companies on the island occupy as many towns. There are about 1200 rifles still in the hands of organizations operating against us. A small per cent, of them are organized bands of robbers, but there are possibly loco rifles still in the possession of organized insurgents. In Antique, Fullon has 300, which he has kept fairly well in hand. In Capiz, there are two commands, one directly under Diocno, which has been held in the mountainous district to the west of Capiz, and another in the mountains southwest under Estebon Cuartero. The two together claim to be able to unite 500 rifles. In lloilo, Delgado, Quintin Sallas, and Joaquin de la Pena hold commands. It is estimated that in the attack on Dumangas they united between four and five hundred rifles. Under such conditions, our Panay garrisons have to be kept strong enough to stand off any one of these commands as a unit until assistance can reach them. Some additional rifles found their way into the island in June through the north coast. They are reported to have been brought from Luzon by one Solis, who came down down to reconcile differences between Diocno and Cuartero.

These commands live in small barrios in detachments, and go about in the usual Sinimay dress, and as the people of the island are a unit against us, no case of betrayal has yet occurred. On the question at issue no Judas has been found in the million of people.

In Cebu the island seems to be fairly covered by our troops, but there are a few wandering insurgents in the hills, with possibly 100 rifles. They go about in small detachments and disturb the peace very greatly. The troops find much difficulty in meeting with them, but the number of these malechores is being gradually diminished.


Major H. C. Hale, 44th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, commanding Bohol, reports his people tranquil and following their daily pursuits.

In Leyte there are but few rifles in the hands of the insurgents and those who have them do not know how to use them. They have always carried the bolo and if they succeed in getting inside of a soldier's guard they are apt to do some execution. Fortunately they have seldom succeeded in accomplishing much, and are becoming conscious of their inability to cope with our weapons, and a better state of things is gradually growing. Colonel Murray, 43d Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, has the island girdled with troops, occupying the larger towns, and is connecting the two coasts by trails, and all seems to point to a speedy subduing of the recalcitrant people on that island.

The internal disturbances have greatly demoralized the industries of these islands. Under normal conditions, Panay and Cebu should grow enough to carry their population through the year. Panay is a great rice-growing island and crops are regular and the yield excellent. In Cebu a great deal of corn is grown, for which the country is adapted. Negros is a sugar-growing island and, owing to the greater profit in that article, the growth of food-stuffs for home consumption has been greatly neglected. No deficiency is reported from Uohol. Their deficiency in corn has usually been supplied from Cebu, but as very little planting has been done in Cebu, it may ultimately appear that Bohol is short. Leyte is a hemp-producing island, and food-stuffs have always been supplied to help out the short supply of rice of home production.

Complaints of want have come in from Leyte, Cebu and Negros. Efforts have been, and are being, made to supply work on public works, highways, etc., to enable the poor to supply their necessities by purchase of rice being imported from China, but whether these efforts will be sufficient to meet the case is still uncertain. The great trouble lies in the fact that the suffering falls on the innocent. The insurrecto, bandit or fanatic goes about with a rifle and levies on the poor villager for what he wishes, and it has to be given. The time has about come when the floating population of these islands should be given occupation. They are, as a whole, weary of their disturbed condition, but some measures should be taken to provide occupation for the men who have been idle for a long time. Each island has its own needs and it is only a question of what should be taken up. In Negros, Bohol, Cebu and Leyte, roads and port facilities are greatly needed. In Panay a lightly equipped railway running from the vicinity of Iloilo to Capiz would be of great value to the rice and tobacco growers. There would be no difficulty in overcoming the obstacles in the pass of the mountains, and there would not necessarily be any exceptional gradients. The volume and fall of the waters of the Jalaur and Panay would supply all the motive power such a road would require.

Some enterprising man might find employment for many men by bringing water into Iloilo and its suburbs of Jaro and Molo. I think an abundant supply could be gotten from the river Aganan, where it leaves the mountains near Alimodian. I had the volume of this stream measured by an expert during the height of the dry season and it was then running off between one and two millions of gallons per day. The level was run from mean low-water on the strait to Alimodian and the


difference in elevation was reported as 164 feet, which would be ample for conduction by gravity. An effort was made to consolidate Iloilo, Jaro, Molo and Mandurriao into one municipality, which it was supposed would enable them to manage a water supply and an electric light system ot themselves, but it was found that there would be dissatisfaction with such a measure in one of the suburbs and the matter went no further.

The great majority of the towns have their schools in working order, but books are difficult to get, and good teachers are a rarity. By patience and persistence the little people will be qualified for the franchise by the time they have acquired the necessary age.

Thus far we have been able to open but two civil courts, one in Cebu and one for Iloilo, province of Panay. We hope to be able to find competent judges for the other districts of the department in the near future, but the trouble has been in finding competent lawyers who were willing to accept the position.

Respectfully submitted,

R. P. Hughes,
Brigadier General, Commanding.