Exhibit 1311.

[Original in Spanish. D.S. P.I R., 878.5 ]

FEBRUARY ---, 1901.

To the General Diocno and the Chiefs and Officers under his orders.


No one is more interested than the Filipinos in the welfare of our mother country and we fulfill our duty as we should by contributing our grain of sand towards the efforts that are being made in the great work of pacification, by which we desire to see the aggrandizement and welfare of the Philippines.

Yes, gentlemen: It is high time that the smell of powder should no longer fill the air of our fields and hills; that the whistle of bullets should cease; that our abandoned fields should again be cultivated and wealth accrue; and, in a word, it is already time for us to seek peace, being convinced that when it is assured, we shall be able to see the aggrandizement of our country, an aggrandizement which we can never expect to attain by strife, in view of its sterility which has been proved by events that lead to nothing but our ruin and perdition.

This has been understood by Paterno, Buencamino, Flores, and other illustrious men, formerly members of the late Malolos Government. This is also understood by the Mellizas, Aranetas, Avanceņas and others belonging to the Federal Party of Iloilo, and we, also, considering the matter with the impartiality with which we study problems of so in. tricate a character, so understand it.

In fact, without considering the other aspects of the case, and looking only to the logic of events, the question presents three capital points, says the message sent by the Molo Committee to General Delgado.

These points are: the Treaty of Paris, the North American Congress and the Philippine resistance.

The "Treaty of Paris," although we would like to discuss its validity, is held as valid by the nations as they recognize it by remaining passive, or more graphically, they look with indifference and without horror upon the blood of the Filipinos and Americans which for almost two years has been shed in a conflict arising from the provisions of said Treaty.

With the Treaty before us, we find that the second paragraph of its 9th artIcle IS as follows: The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States, shall be determined by Congress.

And from this point of view, the re-election of McKinley by a majority of 11 votes, assures us that Congress will undoubtedly sanction his policy.

Taking it for granted also that the action of Congress will consist in the sanction of the policy of McKinley, there remains only the third section of the problem which we have propounded; the resistance of the Filipinos. Now then; should this resistance be made? Is it advisahle to make it, or is it more prudent, or even beneficial, to abandon it? This is for us, the synthesis of the problem with regard to which we present the following considerations. The resistance mentioned can have no other reason than: 1. To provoke thereby the intervention of the nations in favor of the cause. 2. To defeat the Army of the United States, and 3. Tire the North American nation until it decides to abandon us.

The first one we may consider as decided with the result that the nations will not intervene in our favor when they do not do so for Transvaal and the Orange Free State, where there is more reason to do so, as at the present day nations act only when they have greater or lesser interests involved.

With regard to the second consideration, without humiliating ourselves, we confess that we cannot defeat the army of the United States, and furthermore' when Congress resolves upon the termination or suppression of the war, it authorizes the constituted government to make the necessary sacrifice for the purpose.

Can it be expected that by guerrilla warfare, by harassing the Americans everywhere, and molesting them in so far as possible, they will finally grow weary and abandon us? As Congress has voted that the war should be ended it has become a question of national honor, and this being the case, it would be difficult to tire out the American people. Furthermore if they have not become tired in two years, it is improbable that they will tire in four more.

On the other hand, the situation will daily become more critical for us. Our resources of war will be in inverse ratio to the time of the duration of the situation, without great hopes of improving the same by assistance from abroad, and provisions will daily become scarcer in proportion to the recrudescence of the struggle with the abandonment of agricultural pursuits, an abandonment which is a necessary consequence of disturbances, of the fear of reprisals and the lack of animals for the work of the fields.

And if, on the whole, there is no further object or reason for resistance, when Congress decides that it must be ended, is it not better to evade the weight of the law of the conqueror in time and secure the best possible results from the situation? The longer the struggle is continued the more sacrifices it will mean for America, without considering what it will cost us, and consequently the reimbursement which the former will later demand, when her triumph is complete, will be so much greater. This is equivalent to a statement that the c'onditions will be more onerous for the conquered. Why, then, this struggle? There is no doubt that a compromise at the present time would give us more benefits than we would later secure, when the North American nation will have made more disbursements and more sacrifices of lives, because all those sacrifices will demand a just, if not an exorbitant indemnity. What is the use of a struggle then, without any probability of success, and when it can and will only serve as a cause for rendering the compromise later more humiliating when it becomes necessary?

Above all as we shall be finally defeated and shall be required to live with the conquering American people, is it not reasonable to accept it now under better conditions and not later, when, as we have said, the sacrifices made will aggravate these conditions? And more, if such living together is necessary, as it is, is it not more beneficial for us to reduce the distances and abysses which the \var daily places between us? And do not let us forget the victims we will be hereafter responsible for in a useless struggle.

Consider these reasons, we beg of you, earnestly; weigh them impartially, and if you believe them just, we call upon you to lay down your arms, seeking the benefits of the amnesty, in order that with peace and the enjoyment of all individual rights and liberties we may work together for the regeneration of our beloved Philippines.

If you, as we do not doubt, accede to this request, we believe it useless to tell you that we shall all work together, in order that the constituted government, in whose nobility, liberality and good intentions regarding the welfare and progress of these Islands, we have confidence, will secure to you the greatest guarantees regarding your persons and the exercise of pacific and legal interests.

And awaiting your reply, we are, etc.

(26 signatures.)

MAMBUSAO, [CAPIZ], February, 1901